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"The law may not change the heart, but it can restrain the 
heartless. Sinful men must be restrained or else they will 
destroy the precious lives of our innocent women and 
children. " 
1 
- Martin Luther King 
Child pornography is a phenomenon that has evaded precise legal definition for a 
long time. Even today there is no universally accepted definition. This is due, in 
part, to the lack of a universally accepted definition of a "child". 
Definition of a "child" 
Different countries define a "child" differently. In Canada a child, for the purpose 
of child pornography, is a person under the age of eighteen years. 1 In the United 
States of America different states have different definitions of a child. The states of 
Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Rhode Island, 
and Wisconsin define a child as a person under the age of eighteen. 2 The states of 
Penal Code Sec 163. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat.Ann. ss1-215, 13-3508-3551 to 3555 (West Supp. 1978); Del. Code 
Ann. Tit.l1, s1103 (Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. s847.014 (l)(a) (Harrison Supp. 
1978) ; Ga.CodeAnn. ss54-309.1, 74-104 (Harrison 1973 &Supp. 1978); Iowa Code 
Ann. Section 728.1 (West Supp. 1978); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, s29A 
(Michie!Law. Co-op Supp. 1978) ; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. s750.145c (Supp. 1978); 
Minn. Stat.Ann. 5617.246 (West Supp. 1978); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5650:1 (Supp. 
1977); N.D. Cent. Code 514-10-01 (Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
52919.22(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1979); R.I. Gen. Laws s 11-9-1 to 1.1 (Supp. 1979); 
Tenn. Code Ann. ss39-1019, 50-707 (t) (Supp. 1978); Va. Code ss1-13, 42,18 .2-
379 (1975); W. Va. Code s61-8A-6 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. s940.203(6) (West 
( continued ... ) 
2 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oldahoma,Pennsylvania, South Carolina and 
South Dakota define a child as a person under the age of sixteen. 3 The states of 
Alabama, Louisiana, Montana and Texas define a child as a person under the age of 
seventeen.4 The federal law defines a child as a person under the age of sixteen. S The 
states of Illinois and Nebraska define a child as a person under sixteen or who 
appears as a prepubescent. 6 Indiana defines a child as one who is or appears to be 
under sixteen. 7 





( ... continued) 
Supp. 1979). 
Alaska Stat. sl1.41.455 (Supp. 1978); Cal. Lab. Code s1309.5 (West Supp. 1979) 
and Cal. Penal Code s311.4 (West Supp . 1979); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. s53a-1939 
West Supp. 1979); Haw. Rev. Stat. s707-750 to 751 (Supp. 1978); Kan. Stat.Ann. 
s21-3516 (Supp. 1978) ; Me. Rev. Stat.Ann. tit. 17, s2921 (West Supp. 1978); Md. 
Ann. Code art. 27, s419A (Supp. 1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. s2A:142A-l (West Supp. 
1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. s30-6-1 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. Penal Law 5263.00 McKinney 
Supp. 1978); N .C. Gen. Stat. s14-190.6 (Supp. 1977); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 
ss1021.2 to.3 (West Supp. 1978); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. s6312 (Purdon Supp. 
1978); S.c. Code s16-15-180 (1976); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. ss22-22-23 to 24 
(Supp. 1978). 
Ala. Code tit. 13, ss7 -231 to 238 (Supp. 1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. s14:81.1 (West 
Supp. 1978); Mo. Ann. Stat. s568.060 (Vemon Pamph. Supp. 1979); Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. Tit. 9,5543.23,. 2S (Vemon 1974 &Supp. 1978). 
(18 U.S.C.A s52252, 2256) 
Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 38, s11-20a (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp.1978); Neb. Rev. Stat. 
s28-1463 (supp. 1978)It is submitted that the definitions adopted by the States of 
Illinois, Nebraska and Indiana are unsatisfactory. These could be used to prevent 
adults, who appear much younger than they are, from posing for sexually explicit 
materials. The definitions, as they stand, are vague. It has been suggested, with good 
reason, that these definitions are constitutionally broad. T. Christopher Donnelly, 
Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and 
Enforceable Legislation, 1979 Journal of Law Reform Vol12:2 295 at 320. 
Kentucky provides for two age classifications (sixteen and eighteen) and varies 
punishment according to the victim's age (KYRev. Stat. Ss 531.300-370 Supp 1978). 
Ind. Code ss35-30-1O.1-2 to 3 (Supp.1978). 
3 
person under the age of eighteen. In South Africa a child is defined as a person under 
the age of eighteen. This definition is found in the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 and 
in the South African Constitution.8 Concerns regarding the definition of child 
pornography were voiced in Parliament when the Films and Publications BiW was 
being debated. It was suggested that the debate about child pornography is still 
raging because of the fear surrounding the fact that there is no definition of 
pornography. 10 
Definition of "pornography" 
The concept of pornography is admittedly an elusive one resulting in a failure to 
effectively combat the problem. What amounts to pornography depends to a large 
extent on the society and the community in which it surfaces. Whether a particular 
depiction will be labelled as pornographic or not depends on different cultural, moral, 
social and religious beliefs. It accordingly follows that the determination of what 
amounts to pornography is a subjective determination and it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to formulate a legal definition which can encompass all of these 
inherent subjective elements. 
The problem of defining "pornography", coupled with the varying definitions of a 
"child", pose an almost insurmountable problem to those who seek to address the 
problem of child pornography. After all, it is not easy to prevent a phenomenon 





Section 28(3) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
Now the Films and Publications Act 6S of 1996. 
Hansard, Debates of the Senate, 3rd session, 1 sl parliament, 10 October 1996. 
Some international bodies have, however, attempted to reach a common, if not, very 
similar defmition of child pornography. For example, the United Nations defines 
child pornography as "any visual or audio material which uses children in a sexual 
context". Child pornography is seen as consisting of the visual depiction of a child 
( continued ... ) 
4 
Child Pornography as a Worldwide Problem 
Child pornography is a world-wide problem of staggering proportion. The size of the 
industry was highlighted at the World Congress against the Commercial Exploitation 
of Children. 12 It is estimated that more than one million children worldwide are used 
in the production of pornographic material and that this is a multi-billion dollar 
industry. 13 Child pornography has not received the attention that other issues 
relating to children, such as child prostitution and child labour, have received. It is 
submitted that this may be attributed, in part, to the lack of a uniform definition of 
child pornography as well as to the clandestine nature of the industry. Child 
pornography is something which definitely exists but the clandestine nature of the 
industry allows perpetrators to evade detection resulting in the impression that the 
industry is not a massive and lucrative one. This could be one of the reasons for the 
lack of attention given to the problem. One of the aims of the Congress 14 was to 
draw the attention of the international community to the severity and the reality of 
the problem of child pornography. 





( ... continued) 
engaged in explicit sexual conduct, real or simulated, or the lewd exhibition of the 
genitals intended for the sexual gratification of the user, and involves the production, 
distribution and/or use of such material. The Council of Europe defines child 
pornography as "any audio-visual material which uses children in a sexual context". 
The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) defines child 
pornography as "the visual depiction of the sexual exploitation of a child, focusing on 
the child's sexual behaviour or genitals". There is certainly a common thread running 
through all of these definitions. 
Held in Stockholm, Sweden from 27-31 August 1996.The Planning Committee 
consisted of the Government of Sweden; the United Nations Children Fund 
(UNICEF); the non-governmental organisations: End Child Prostitution in Asian 
Tourism (ECPAT); and the Group for the Convention on the Rights of the child. 
Page 1 of the background document for the World Congress against the Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation prepared by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 
conjunction with (ECPAT). 
Supra. 
5 
South Mrica ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 16 June 1995 15 
and is accordingly under a duty to implement all appropriate measures to prevent the 
exploitative use of children in pornographic materials and performances. Article 
34(c) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides as follows: 
"State parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and 
sexual abuse. "16 For these purposes, State parties shall in particular take all 
appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: 
(a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual 
activity; 
(b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual 
practices; 
(c) the exploitative use of children In pornographic performances and 
materials. 17 
Clause (c) expressly requires state parties to take action against child pornography. 
This is an issue which was not addressed in South Mrica previously. However, as a 
party to this convention South Mrica has made notable efforts to fulfil its obligations 
in terms of the above article. Much has been done to improve the quality of life of 




This is the most Widely ratified human rights treaty in history. As at the end of 
February 1996 it had been ratified by 187 out of 193 governments. Only the Cook 
Islands, Oman, Somalia and the United Arab Emirates had not ratified. 
The Convention defines a child as anyone below the age of 18 years. 
The Convention defines child pornography as "any visual or audio material which uses 
children in a sexual context". Child pornography is seen as consisting of the visual 
depiction of a child engaged in explicit sexual conduct, real or simulated, or the lewd 
exhibition of the genitals intended for the sexual gratiflcation of the user, and involves 
the production, distribution and/or use of such material. 
6 
most important step was the entrenchment of children's rights in the Bill of Rights. 18 
The second step was the legislative prohibition on the production, importation and 
possession of publications and films containing child pornography. 19 This marks the 
beginning of a children's rights culture in South Africa. 
Bearing these difficulties in mind, this work critically analyses the prohibition on the 
possession of child pornography by the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996. 
Chapter 2 of this work deals briefly with the history of obscenity legislation in South 
Africa and its culmination in the promulgation of the Films and Publications Act 65 
of 1996 (hereafter referred to as "the Act") . The Act is also dealt with very briefly . 
The chapter focuses on the rationale behind a statutory prohibition on the possession 
of child pornography. The objective is to find out whether such a prohibition is really 
necessary and if so , why . 
Chapter 3 is devoted to a detailed analysis of those provisions in the Act which deal 
with child pornography. Attention is drawn to potential problems with the Act. 
Some of these problems have already been remedied by the Films and Publications 
Amendment Act of 1999. 
Chapter 4 focuses on South African cases dealing with possession and privacy. Our 
courts have not yet had the opportunity to deal with child pornography in terms of 
the Act. It will be interesting to see how they implement the provisions of the Act 
in the light of the constitution. 
Chapter 5 examines foreign case law and legislation dealing with possession of child 
18 
19 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
Secti.on 28 encompasses the constitutional rights of children. One of those right s is 
the nght to be protected from maltreatment, neglect , abuse or degradation as set out 
in Section 28 (1) (d). 
Section 27 of the Films and Publicat ions Act 65 of 1996. 
7 
pornography. The American and Canadian approaches are examined in some detail. 
The approaches adopted by other countries is mentioned with the aim of establishing 
internationals trends in the area of child protection. 
Chapter 6 sees the conclusion of this work. The submissions made in the preceding 
chapters are summarised and reasons are given as to why the prohibition may not 
achieve its aims. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION 
ON THE POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
The Films And Publications Act 65 of 1996 
8 
The promulgation of the Films and Publications Aceo (hereafter referred to as "the 
Act") has been a welcome step for South Mrica. This Act, besides dealing with the 
classification of films and publications, also prohibits the possession of films and 
publications dealing with child pornography. The Act has been a long-awaited 
instrument for the protection of children from e:Arposure to and use in the production 
pornography. 
Reasons for the Prohibition on Possession of Child Pornography 
At the very outset the burning question which must be asked is: "Is there a need to 
prevent child pornography by means oflegislation and if so, why?" This is a question 
which is often asked by those who see child pornography as just another evil which 
cannot be eliminated by legislation. The answer cannot be anything but in the 
affirmative. There is indeed a dire need to prevent child pornography as there is to 
prevent all other forms of human rights and children's rights violations. One 
common argument in favour of criminalising the production and possession of child 
pornography is that consumers of pornography are tempted to carry out what they 
view or read. In other words, pornography leads to rape, child molestation and other 
forms of violence against children and women. This may be true but to date there 
has been no scientific or empirical evidence to support such argument. 
There are, however, convincing reasons for the prevention of child pornography, some 
of which are the following: 
20 Act 65 of 1996. 
9 
1. Pornography harms the children who are used in its production. 
There may be harm to the physiological, emotional and mental health of the 
child. It has been found that sexually exploited children are unable to develop 
healthy relationships as adults, have se:A'Ual dysfunctions, have a tendency to 
become sexual abusers in later life and are predisposed to self destructive 
behaviour such as alcohol and drug abuse and prostitution.
21 
This argument is not without merit but neither is it flawless. One cannot 
assume that a child depicted in pornographic material always suffers harm. 
What about candid photographs taken of a pair of youngsters swimming 
together in the nude? These children suffer no harm of any kind as they are 
caught on camera without their knowledge. Furthermore, they are not forced 
or coerced by the photographer into doing anything. How can it then be said 
that these children are harmed by the taking of pornographic photographs 
when they have absolutely no idea that such photographs have even been 
taken? This example proves that harm to the child is not present in all cases. 22 
2 . Pornography affects the child's adult life. 
It has been suggested that "pornography poses an even greater threat to the 
child victim than does SeA'Ual abuse or prostitution. Because the child's actions 
are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, 
long after the original misdeed took place. A child who has posed for a 
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within 




New York v Ferber 458 U.S . 747 (1982) at 758-60, n9. 
This is, however, a case of invasion of privacy. Despite this, there is no emotional 
trauma or mental anguish suffered by the child. 
Shouvlin: Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model A ct, (1981) 17 W ake 
Forest Law Rev 535' 545. 
10 
a situation is to be found in the case of Brooke Shields,24 a famous actress and 
model. When Brooke Shields was sixteen years old she sued a photographer 
to enjoin the publication of nude photographs taken of her at age ten. Her 
reason for doing this was that the photographs embarrassed her and she felt 
that they would jeopardise her reputation.
25 
It is submitted that this reason for the prevention of child pornography is not 
as convincing as it appears at first sight. There are many things and incidents 
in a person's life which cause him/her embarrassment. Should we then 
criminalise all of these things simply because they have the potential to cause 
embarrassment? To do so would certainly lead to absurd results. Why then 
should child pornography be treated differently? Is it because of the nature of 
child pornography? This can be the only acceptable answer. Child 
pornography, because of its nature, can cause painful humiliation as opposed 
to mere embarrassment. It is submitted that painful humiliation is 
experienced when the child feels a sense of deep shame and responsibility for 
what has happened to him or her. Embarrassment, it is submitted, is a less 
intense feeling than humiliation and is more lighthearted. It does not have the 
negative connotations associated with humiliation since it does not include an 
element of shame. 
3. Children do not have the capacity to consent to the acts depicted in 
pornographic materials. 
Despite the definition of a child in South Africa as discussed in chapter one 
above the age of consent for sexual intercourse is sixteen years. The Sexual 
Offences Act 23 of 1957 provides an age limit of sixteen for sexual intercourse 
24 
25 
Shields v Gross 448 N.E 2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1983). 
The New York Court of Appeals held that Brooke Shields could not revoke her 
mother's prior consent to the sale of the photographs. 
11 
and nineteen for immoral or indecent acts.26 Labuschagne is of the view that 
these age limits are arbitrary.27 It is submitted that this may be so but with 
good reason. There is no obj ective formula which would enable us to draw the 
line between childhood and adulthood. It may be argued by some that the 
only solution is to conduct a subjective inquiry into the level of maturity of 
each child. This is the ideal solution but it is not a practical one. The only 
other solution is to adopt a particular age limit which is not incompatible with 
the age of consent for marriage28 and the age of majority.29 It is submitted 
that this is what has been done in South Africa. 
In terms of the common law a girl over the age of twelve years can validly consent 
to sexual intercourse. The consent of such girl is a defence to a charge of rape but 
does not prevent a conviction under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act30 which 
makes sexual intercourse with a girl under sixteen a statutory offence unless she is 
married. The conclusion here is simply that there can be no lawful sexual intercourse 
with a person under the age of sixteen in South Africa31 (unless such intercourse takes 
place within the bounds of marriage). It is submitted that the inability of a child to 
consent to acts of a sexual nature is the main difference between adult pornography 
and child pornography. Adult pornography is the depiction of consensual sexual acts 







Section 14 (1) and 14(3). 
"Ouderdomsgrense en die Bestraffing van Pedofilie" (1990) 16 SACJ 10. 
In terms of s26(1) ofthe Marriage Act No. 25 of 1961 the age of consent for marriage 
is 15 for females and 18 for males. 
In terms of section 1 of the Age of MajOrity Act No. 57 Of 1972 the age of majority 
is 21 for both males and females in South Africa. 
Act No. 23 of 1957. 
Section 14(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 proVides that sexual intercourse 
by a female with a male under the age of sixteen is an offence. On the whole, the law 
does prohibit sexual intercourse with girls and boys under the age of sixteen. 
12 
whether to participate in the production of pornography or not. A child, on the other 
hand, does not have the capacity to do so. There cannot be any doubt that this is a 
solid reason for criminalising child pornography. It amounts to exploitation of 
children for commercial gain or personal sexual gratification. This certainly calls for 
protection of children from pornographers. 
An important issue to consider is the age requirement in child pornography 
legislation. The main reason for the prohibition on child pornography is that the 
child is unable to consent to the sexual conduct involved in the pornography. If the 
child is over the age of consent required for sexual conduct, the sexual conduct that 
the child engages in will be lawful. This is regardless of whether such sexual conduct 
is pornographic or not. It follows therefore that a prohibition on child pornography 
must incorporate an age requirement that is neither lower nor higher than the age 
of consent for lawful sexual conduct. If the age requirement for child pornography 
is higher than that for consensual sexual conduct, there will be problems. It has often 
been argued that the possession of child pornography should be prohibited because 
it causes injury to the child. 32 If, however, the child is engaging in conduct that he 
or she is capable of consenting to, then it cannot be argued that the child has suffered 
injury. 33 
John Quigley34 uses the cases of New York v Ferber35 and Osborne v Ohio36 to illustrate 
this point. In the former case the statute regulated sexually eArplicit depictions by 






New York v Ferber 458 US. 747 (1982) at 753. 




495 US. 103 (1990) . 
13 
was seventeen. This meant that sexual conduct in terms of the New York child 
pornography legislation was unlawful. In the latter case the Ohio statute did not 
specify an age requirement but the court specified that the age was eighteen. The 
age of consent for seA'Ual conduct was, however, fifteen. This meant that in a 
pornographic depiction of a child over the age of fifteen but under the age of 
eighteen, the sexual conduct depicted would be considered lawful. The message here 
is that a child of, for example, fifteen years, may lawfully engage in sexual conduct but 
a depiction of such conduct is unlawful. 
It is submitted that if child pornography legislation sets an age requirement that is 
lower than the age of consent for sexual conduct, the legislation will not be fulfilling 
its purpose which is to protect children. It is further submitted that a child who is 
not old enough to consent to seA'Ual conduct is not old enough to be depicted in 
pornographic material. If, for example, the child pornography legislation sets the age 
limit at sixteen but the age of consent for seA'Ual conduct is eighteen, there exists a 
lacuna in the law. The seventeen year old child is left at the mercy of child 
pornographers. Does this say that the seventeen year old child may not lawfully 
engage in sexual conduct but that if he or she does so, then depictions of such 
conduct may be lawfully distributed or possessed? It is not sufficient to say that in 
this case it is the unlawful sexual conduct itself which will attract liability. Adopting 
that stance would amount to punishing the action and ignoring the expression. It 
is crucial that we punish the distribution and the possession of such depictions in 
order to provide children with the maximum protection possible. It will always be 
easy to assume that if one piece of legislation does not provide a remedy another will. 
This cavalier attitude will not do when dealing with something as precious as 
children's rights. 
14 
In South Mrica the age of consent for seA'Ual intercourse is sixteen37 but the age limit 
for child pornography is eighteen years. 38 We are accordingly faced with the situation 
where a child may lawfully engage in sexual conduct but such conduct may not be 
recorded. It is difficult to understand the rationale behind this. It is also possible 
that this discrepancy will come under constitutional attack. A seventeen year old 
child may argue that the age limit for the prohibition of pornography, in terms of the 
Films and Publications Act, amounts to an infringement of his/ her right to free 
economic activity. The child may want to perform in pornographic movies but will 
not be hired by anyone in the industry because they do not want to contravene the 
Act. This is an area for further research. 
The Sexual Offences Act39 also provides that a person under the age of nineteen 
cannot lawfully participate in immoral acts. Does this mean that possession of a 
pornographic photograph of a person who is over eighteen but under nineteen will 
not attract liability? The actual act of committing an indecent or immoral act with 
the person under nineteen years amounts to an offence but the recording of such act 
amounts to an offence only if the child is under eighteen years. 40 This inevitably 
means that possession of such a recording is not an offence because the child depicted 
therein is over the age of eighteen. 
The above combinations indicate the need to draft anti- child pornography legislation 





Sections 14 1 (a) and 14 3 (a) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. 
Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996, Schedule I. 
Supra. 
The definition of child pornography as contained in the Films and Publications Act 
65 of 1996 makes reference to a child under the age of 18. It can therefore be safely 
assun:e~ that a depiction will not constitute child pornography if the child depicted 
therel~ IS over the age of 18. Such depiction will be classified as adult pornography 
and WIll therefore enjoy constitutional protection. 
15 
to ensure that all loopholes are closed thereby giving children the protection they 
desperately need. 
Section 27 of the Films and Publications Act4 1 prohibits the possession of films and 
publications containing child pornography. It can be argued that the problem of 
child pornography has to be attacked at all levels, that is, at the levels of production, 
importation, distribution and possession. One can understand the need to curb 
production, importation and distribution. Is it necessary, however, to prohibit 
possession also or does that amount to legislative overkill? 
Several reasons have been advanced as to why individuals possess child 
pOlTIography: 42 
1. Individuals use pornography to aid in sexual stimulation. Some use it as a 
prelude to actual sexual activity with children. 
2. Paedophiles use child pornography to convince themselves that their behaviour 
and inclinations are normal and are shared by other so-called "normal" people. 
3. Child abusers use child pornography to lower the inhibitions of children so 
that they would engage in seJ\..'Ual activity. 
4. Pornography may be used under the guise of "sex education" to stimulate 
sexual arousal in children. 
5. Child pornography ensures that there will always be an image of the child at 
the age of sexual preference. 
6. Pornographic materials are used to ensure the silence of victimised children by 
threatening to show such materials to their parents, friends , etc. 




Child Pornography and Paedophilia: Report made by the permanent Subcommittee 
on Invest igations. U.S . Senate, 99th Congress. 2d Sec. 34 (1986) U.S . Senate Report. 
16 
good faith when establishing contact with paedophiles, child molesters, etc. 
8. Some exploiters use child pornography to gain access to other sex markets and 
to other children. 
The first point is problematic in the sense that many things, other than child 
pornography, can be used to aid in sexual stimulation. It is neither possible nor 
realistic to prohibit the use of all such things. The practical difficulty in attempting 
to do something like that is that it is impossible to compile a list of all those things 
which can be used to aid in sexual stimulation. Each individual is unique and 
different things stimulate different people. It is submitted that the answer lies in 
looking at the nature of child pornography. Once again it is undeniable that child 
pornography is different because of its reprehensible nature. Most of the other things 
that are used to aid in sexual stimulation do not cause harm to other people. Child 
pornography exploits and harms children and cannot be tolerated for that reason. 
The second point that child molesters use child pornography to convince children to 
engage in sexual conduct is contentious. There is nothing to suggest that child 
molesters do not use adult pornography for the same purpose. It is submitted that 
adult pornography can also be used to lower the inhibitions of children so that they 
would engage in sexual activity. In fact, it is possible that adult pornography would 
be more likely to lower a child's inhibitions than child pornography would. Children 
often believe that adults are always right and they tly to emulate them. If a child sees 
a pornographic film or picture depicting adults that child is likely to believe that the 
depicted conduct is acceptable. Can it then be said that there should be a prohibition 
on adult pornography as well because such material may be used by child molesters 
to coerce children into engaging in sexual conduct? Should the law proscribe 
constitutionally protected e:h.rpression such as adult pornography simply because it 
may be used to harm or exploit children? Should the law then not go further and 
impose a ban on the possession of all potentially harmful items such as guns, knives, 
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whips, etc.? This list is infinite for the simple reason that almost any object can be 
used to inflict harm, especially on a child. 
This argument can be taken even further to cover evelything that could possibly be 
used to coerce children to engage in se:A'Ual conduct. What about sweets, toys and all 
possible gifts that can be used to win a child over? It is known that child abusers use 
many strategies to entice children into engaging in sexual activity. Sweets, toys, 
clothes, money, rides in expensive cars, are only a few of the things that are used by 
child abusers to gain the friendship and trust of children thereby making them more 
receptive to sexual advances. It is quite obvious that the situation becomes a 
ludicrous one and that arguments made in favour of proscribing the possession of 
child pornography must therefore be made with extreme caution. 
The other points made above do have merit and prove that the negative aspects of 
child pornography clearly outweigh the positive aspects. It is submitted that efforts 
to treat child pornography as just another sex aid or aphrodisiac will never be 
successful for the simple reason that child pornography runs contrary to our sense of 
morality and to the duty of every citizen and the State to protect children. 
I t is admitted that a possessor of child pornography does not necessarily directly cause 
harm to children. After all, he/she is not the person who creates or produces the 
pornographic material. The production stage is the stage at which the child is 
subjected to some form of abuse. Possessors do not participate in this act. It is 
submitted that despite what has been said above, possessors do contribute indirectly 
to the abuse of children. They are also to blame for the abuse and exploitation of 
children because they create a market for child pornography. Possessors provide an 
economic incentive for the production of child pornography. Once this economic 
incentive is removed production will be curtailed. 
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It is submitted that in order for the child pornography industry to be destroyed 
legislation will have to attack production, distribution and possession. It is not 
enough to simply legislate against one part of the industry. For example, if only 
production is criminalised, possessors will find no reason to get rid of the 
pornographic material which they already have in their possession. This will mean 
that those materials which have already been produced will remain in circulation. 
These materials will then be used to entice other children into engaging in sexual 
conduct with adults. The resultant sexual conduct will not be recorded because of the 
criminalisation of production. The material which was used to perpetrate the wrong 
in the first place will still remain in circulation and will continue to be used to harm 
children. This state of affairs can only be terminated if the pornographic material is 
destroyed. It is submitted that only a ban on possession can achieve this . 
CHAPTER 3 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FILMS AND PUBLICATIONS ACT 
65 OF 1996 
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Introduction 
Prior to the union of South Africa there were various pieces of legislation dealing 
with the regulation of indecent and obscene materials. 43 However, none of these 
pieces of legislation specifically or expressly considered child pornography. There 
were also various pieces of legislation dealing with immorality.44 
There were basically three pieces of post-union legislation which dealt with the 
regulation of obscene and indecent materials in South Africa. The first was the 
Publications and Entertainment Act 26 of 1963. This Act was later repealed by the 
Publications Act 42 of 1974. The 1974 Act was used mainly as a tool in the 
prevention of the distribution of indecent and obscene materials. The third piece of 
legislation was the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act 37 of 1967. This 
43 
44 
In the Cape there was the Obscene Publications Act 31 of 1892 (C); in the Transvaal 
there was the Criminal Law Amendment Act 38 of 1909 (T); in the Orange Free State 
there was the Police Offences Ordinance no. 21 of 1902 (0). These pieces of 
legislation dealt with the regulation of domestically produced indecent and obscene 
materials. After union these pieces oflegislation were replaced by a common piece of 
legislation, namely, the Publications and Entertainment Act 26 of 1963. This Act was 
later repealed by the Publications Act 42 of 1974 . 
The different colonies also had different pieces of legislation which prohibited the 
importation of indecent and obscene materials. In Natal there was the Customs 
Consolidation and Shipping Act 13 of 1899 (N); in the Transvaal there was the 
Customs Management Ordinance 23 of 1902 (T); in the Cape there was the Customs 
Act 10 of 1872 (C). After the union of the colonies these different pieces of 
legislation were replaced by one common piece of legislation, namely, the Customs 
Management Act 9 of 1913. This Act prohibited the importation and posting of 
indecent and obscene matter. 
In the Cape there was The Betting Houses, Gaming Houses and Brothels SuppreSSion 
Act no. 36 of 1902; in the Transvaal there was The Immorality Ordinance no. 46 of 
1903; in the Orange Free State there was The Suppression of Brothels and Immorality 
Ordinance no. 11 of 1903. 
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Act prohibited the possession of obscene or indecent photographic matter. Section 
2(1) of the 1967 Act, which deals with the possession of obscene photographic 
material, came under constitutional attack recently and was found to be in violation 
of the right to privacy.4s 
In August 1994 the Minister of Home Affairs , Dr M G Buthelezi, appointed a Task 
Group to draft a new Act which would replace the Publications Act of 1974. When 
the cases of Case v Minister of Safery and Securiry; Curtis v Minister of Safery and 
Securiry46 were referred to the constitutional court, the Task Group advised the 
minister that the prohibition on possession of indecent or obscene matter, in terms 
of the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act47 violated the individual's right 
to privacy as enshrined in section 13 of the interim constitution.48 
The task group was divided on the issue of imposing a ban on the possession on child 
pornography in the new Act. The majority felt that such a prohibition was rendered 
necessary by the ever-increasing rate of child abuse in South Africa. The minority 
was of the view that possession of pornographic material does not indicate with 
certainty that some form of abuse has occurred. They felt that section 14 of the 
Sexual Offences Act could be used to protect children if there was suspicion of abuse 
within the home. In other words, they were of the view that the inclusion of a 
prohibition on possession in the new Act would amount to legislative overldll. Their 





In Case and Another v Minister Of Safety And Security And Others; Curtis v Minister 
of Safety and Security and Others 1995 (1) SACR 587 (CC). 
1996 (1) SACR 587 (CC). Both accused were charged in terms of the Indecent and 
Obscene Photographic Matter Act for the possession of obscene photographs. The 
accused challenged the constitutionality of the offences with which they were charged. 
Act 37 of 1967. 
Act 200 of 1993. 
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distribution would afford children adequate protection. 
In addition, the minority felt that a ban on the possession of child pornography 
would amount to a violation of the individual's right to privacy. Kobus Van Rooyen
49 
reminds us that while our attempts to protect children by imposing a ban on the 
possession of child pornography are noble, we should always remember South Mrica' s 
painful past. In so doing he mal(es the following comment which will undoubtedly 
be shared by many South Mricans: 
"the spectre of the past.. .. where police would go through one's private 
library in search of what may possibly be undesirable, is to my mind so 
abominable that the mere fact of possession of child pornography 
simply does not justify any invasion. "50 
It is respectfully submitted that this is a valid concern but does it necessarily mean 
that we should simply tolerate the current disintegration of children's rights in this 
country?51 The answer is an emphatic "no!" The protection of children's rights and 
the right to privacy are not mutually exclusive. We must simply ensure that in 
interpreting and implementing our new legislation we do not create scope for or 
condone arbitrary police action. 
This Act has brought about much needed reform in the areas of censorship and 





Kobus Van Rooyen, se, University of Pretoria. 
Van Rooyen, K. The End of The Indecent or Obscene PhotographiC M atter A ct, (1996) 
SAC} (1996) 9:3 at 329. 
Schurink, E. (Human Sciences Research Council South Africa) Statistics of Shame: 
South Africa's Child Protection System D isintegrating. (1996) 4 :3 Focus Forum 6. 
The Act ensures that there is no arbitrary censorship of films and publications. 
Provision is made for the classification of films and the establishment of a Films 
( continued ... ) 
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however, not flawless. There are many ambiguous and vague terms and phrases used 
in the Act. These pose a problem for those seeking to interpret certain provisions of 
the Act. The problems are analysed and solutions are suggested. 
Definitions of terms used in the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996 
Section 27 of the ActS3 provides as follows: 
(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if he or she knowingly-
(a) creates, produces, imports or is in possession of a publicationS4 which 
contains a visual presentationSS of child pornography; or 
(b) creates, distributes, produces, imports or is in possession of a filmS6 





and Publications Board as well as a Films and Publications Review Board. At the 
same time the Act expressly prohibits child pornography by imposing certain age 
restrictions . In this way the Act strikes a balance between children's rights and the 
constitutional rights of all South Africans. 
Act 65 of 1996. 
Section 1 of the Act deftnes a publication as: 
(a) any newspaper, book, periodical, pamphlet, poster or other printed matter; 
(b) any writing or typescript which has in any manner been duplicated; 
(c) any dra-wing, picture, illustration or painting; 
(d) any print, photograph, engraving or lithograph; 
(e) any record, magnetic tape, soundtrack, except a soundtrack associated with 
a film, or any other object in or on which sound has been recorded for 
reproduction; 
(f) computer software which is not a film; 
(h) any ftgure, carving, statue or model. 
(i) any message or communication, including a visual presentation placed on any 
distributed network including, but not conftned to, the Internet. 
Section 1 of the Act deftnes a visual presentation as: 
(a) a drawing, picture, illust ration, painting, photograph or image; or 
(b) a drawing, picture , illustration, painting' photograph or image or any 
combination thereof, produced through or by means of computer software on 
a screen or a computer printout. 
Chapter 1 of the Act defines a mm as: 
( continued ... ) 
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which contains a scene or scenes of child pornography. 
Section 1 of the Act defines child pornography to include "any image, real or 
simulated, however created, depicting a person who is, or who is shown as being 
under the age of 18 years, engaged in seL-.'Ual conduct or a display of genitals which 
amounts to sexual exploitation, or participating in, or assisting another person to 
engage in sexual conduct which amounts to Se.A'Ual eL-.'Ploitation or degradation of 
children" . 
Schedule 11 of the Act goes on to define Se.A'Ual conduct as "genitals in a state of 
stimulation or arousal; the lewd display of genitals; masturbation; sexual intercourse, 
which includes anal sexual intercourse; the fondling, or touching with any object, of 
genitals; the penetration of a vagina or anus with any object; oral genital contact; or 
oral anal contact". The Act thus makes reference to "a lewd display of the genitals". 
The question which inevitably arises is: what is the meaning of the term "lewd"? This 
question has vexed the American courts for a long time and it is certain that South 
Mrica is also headed in the same direction. 
The Oxford diction~7 defines "lewd" as "lascivious, unchaste, indecent, obscene". 
We most certainly cannot rely on the words "obscene" and "indecent" for any 
guidance in the interpretation of "lewd" in a legal context. The words "obscene" and 
"indecent" have added enough uncertainty to the law already and hopefully our 
56 
57 
( ... continued) 
(a) any sequence of visual images recorded on any substance, whether a film, 
magnetic tape, disc or any other material, in such manner that by using such 
substance such images will be capable of being seen as a moving picture; 
(b) the soundtrack associated with and any exhibited illustration relating to a film 
as defined in paragraph (a); 
(c) any picture intended for exhibition through the medium of any mechanical, 
electronic or other device. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th edition (1982), Oxford University Press. 
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courts will not follow that route again. These words, as they appeared in the 
Publications and Entertainment Act; 58 the Publications Act 42 of 1974;59 and the 
Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act60 proved highly problematic. 
The following cases are but a few illustrations of the high degree of vagueness 
attached to these words and the resultant uncertainty in the law. In R v Meinert61 
the court interpreted the phrase "indecent and obscene" to mean "subversive of 
morality, or grossly offensive to common propriety". In R v ~2 the court found a 
figurine, alleged by the defence to be a reproduction of the famous street fountain 
in Brussels, depicting a naked boy in the act of urination, to be indecent. The court 
noted that "it is very likely that our people would regard as indecent what the people 
of Brussels are said to have tolerated for more than three hundred years". The court 
in S v F 3 accepted that the phrase "indecent and obscene" as it appeared in the 
Indecent and Obscene Photographic Matter Act64 was simply too wide and the court 
had to engage in a process of narrowing the scope of its application. The court 
formulated a test which would look at the probable effect of the material upon the 
consumer. The question being asked was whether the material had a tendency to 
deprave or corrupt. That test was rejected in S v Nunes 65 where the court concluded 
that: "dit is duidelik ... dat die toets is vir 'n hof om te besluit of uit te maak, in elke 




61 1932 SWA 56 at 60. 
62 1953 (3) SA 52 (SWA) at 55D. 
63 1974 (3) SA 405 (T) at 408 . 
64 Act 37 of 1967. 
65 1975 (4) SA 929 (T) at 931. 
25 
materiaal is in terme van art 1, en dit is 'n objektiewe toets". In S v Film Fun Holdings 
(Pry) Itd and Others 66 the court also rejected the test formulated in S v F7 and 
adopted the test in S v Nunes. 68 Similar problems had been experienced in respect of 
the Publications Act. 69 
It is submitted that, in the light of the abovementioned problems, no reliance should 
be placed on the words "obscene" and "indecent" when attempting to attribute a 
meaning to the word "lewd". To do so would be to open the floodgates to a host of 
problems similar to those encountered by our courts previously. The cases mentioned 
represent only a few of the problematic cases that came before our courts. The only 
possible solution is to ensure that the word "lewd" is given a narrow interpretation 
so as not to cast the proscriptive net too wide. Mfording a narrow interpretation will 
also prevent the relevant section from being declared unconstitutional due to 
vagueness. 
In the American case of New York v Ferber70 the court was faced with a statute which 
covered "actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate seA'Ual intercourse sexual 
bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals" . 
The court acknowledged that the term "lewd" was problematic in the sense that it was 
difficult to define or limit. In upholding the validity of the statute the court said that 
it would not assume "that the New York courts will widen the possibly invalid reach 
of the statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on lewd 
66 1977 (2) SA 377 (E) at 378-9. 
67 Supra. 
68 Supra. 
69 Act no. 42 of 1974 . 
70 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
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exhibition of the genitals".71 Very simply put, the court was saying that the term 
"lewd" must be narrowly interpreted. This does not, however, solve the problem. 
Lewdness is a subjective criterion and some judges may find any display of genitals 
to be lewd. 
How then should our courts determine whether a depiction is lewd or not? The only 
solution is to devise a test to be applied by judges in deciding whether a particular 
depiction is lewd or not. There are two possible tests that can be used here. Firstly, 
there is the "reasonable reader/viewer" test. In terms of this test the focus is on the 
impression gained by the reasonable reader/viewer upon reading or viewing a 
particular publication or film. It is submitted that if the reasonable reader/viewer 
finds the material disgusting, loathsome, repulsive or offensive then that depiction 
may be classified as lewd. 
Who is the reasonable reader/viewer? He is a reader of average intelligence and 
experience. He is neither too liberal nor too conservative. This is a person who is 
well-balanced in every respect. "He is not the highly-educated man, the lawyer, the 
literarian, the theologian, the professional man or the philosopher; nor is he the lowly 
educated, the prude, the narrow-minded or the debased person ... Such a man is one 
who is prepared to malce some allowance for deviations and who is aware that he may 
be wrong in his own views and allows for it. He is a man who is prepared to allow a 
certain amount of latitude to others although he personally does not approve".72 
Simply put, he is an average person. 
How would a court decide whether a particular depiction is disgusting, loathsome or 
repulsive to the reasonable reader? It is submitted that the courts will have to look 
71 
72 
Supra at 773. 
Based on the decision in SAUK v O'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (A) and defined by the 
Publications Appeal Board in its decision on The Dawn Comes Twice (144/76). 
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at contemporary community standards in order to make such a determination. 
"The standards are that of the community at large as represented by the average, 
decent-minded, law-abiding, modern and enlightened citizen with Christian 
principles; not of the libertine or the ultra modern, nor of the prude or ultra-
conservative, but that of the man of balance with a tolerant view in regard to the 
views of others ... Furthermore, it is not how such average citizen himself acts but 
how he believes, after serious reflection, the average citizen should act in society. 
Such a man will consider all relevant factors pertaining to the particular issue before 
him or peculiar to the enquiry. The list of factors he will take into account is never 
closed. Even the time factor must be taken into account: what was undesirable at 
some stage might lose that character with the march of time .. . and vice versa. Such 
a man will take modern trends into account, will examine them and allow for them; 
but not with a rapidity that would shock him or his fellow citizens. "73 
The issue of contemporaneity is crucial and inevitably arises as a matter of logic. 
After all, it would mal<:.e no sense to focus on community standards that prevailed 
twenty or thirty years ago. For example, the attitude of the South African 
community as a whole towards homosexuality has undergone drastic change in the 
last ten years. Homosexuality is certainly more acceptable now than it was ten years 
ago. This is just one example of changing community attitudes towards a particular 
issue. It is thus clear that attitudes change with time, possibly because people become 
more aware of and more knowledgeable about controversial issues. Knowledge wipes 
away fear and suspicion leading to greater levels of tolerance. This is by no means a 
suggestion that people always become more liberal in their thinking as time passes. 
The converse could also be true. People may become more opposed to certain 
practices as they learn more about it. For example, many communities are now 
73 Supra. 
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taking a stand against gangsterism. This may be due, in part, to the knowledge that 
they are gaining about it. Many ex-gangsters are coming forward with their stories 
and communities are becoming aware of the harm caused by gangsterism. Once again 
this illustrates the importance of considering contemporary community standards. 
The second possible test is the "likely reader test". This test involves looking at the 
effect of a publication on the likely readers thereof. At first sight this test appears to 
be a suitable one but upon deeper analysis a fatal problem is discovered. The first 
question that is asked when applying this test is: who are the likely readers of the 
particular publication? In the case of publications containing child pornography there 
is, it is submitted, very often a specific group of people who are likely readers. 
Publications of such a nature usually appeal to people with a specific interest. It is 
submitted that these people do not find the depictions of children repulsive or 
disgusting. If they did find the depictions repulsive they would not be reading such 
publications. They are immune to child pornography. As stated by Steyn, c.J in 
Publications Control Board v William Heinemann Lt£4: "It may be that the reactions of 
some have been so benumbed by repeated exposure to a particular stimulus through 
the reading of many other books, that they tolerate that kind of stimulus with cold 
indifference, even if it is presented in extravagant form. That proves nothing as to 
the reactions of other readers who may more properly have to be regarded as the so-
called average readers". 
In the light of the above, it is submitted that the attitude of the likely reader to a 
particular publication is not indicative of whether such publication is repulsive, 
disgusting or loathsome by community standards. It follows that the "likely reader 
test" has to be rejected in favour of the "average reader test". 
74 1965 (4) SA 137 (A) at 148H. 
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A counter-argument to attributing a narrow meaning to the word "lewd"is that the 
proscriptive net should be cast as wide as possible in order to give children maximum 
protection against child pornographers. This means attributing a wide meaning to the 
word "lewd". This is indeed a noble argument but it loses sight of the fact that such 
an approach is not workable. It created many problems for the courts previously and 
will do so again. 75 It follows that the best approach is to simply adopt a narrow 
interpretation of the word "lewd". The American court in New York v Ferber
76 
also 
resigned itself to this solution. 
The use of the word "lewd" created many problems for the American courts just as 
the words "indecent" and "obscene" vexed our courts. The American courts, for all 
their ingenuity and creativity, failed to suggest an alternative word which would pose 
no problems such as those inherent in the word "lewd". This is not due to 
incompetence on their part but to the fact that the area of obscenity is difficult to 
regulate. One can never know for certain where to draw the line and so the search 
for the perfect word continues. 
The next question which arises in relation to the use of the word "lewd" is : what 
should the lewdness pertain to? Does lewdness refer to the state of the genitals 
(erection, sexual excitement) or does it refer to the demeanour of the person whose 
genitals are being displayed?77 It is possible that a display of genitals may be lewd 




Indecent and Obscene Photographic Matter Act37 of 1967; Publications Act 42 of 
1974. 
Supra. 
John Quigley in his article Child Pornography and the Right to Privao/ (1991) 43 U. Ha. 
L.R 347 at page 385 cites the following excellent example of the uncertainty that 
exists: "A photograph shOWing a nude frontal view of a child waUdng towards the 
ca~era woul~ probably not constitute lewdness. By contrast, if the child had a coy 
faCIal expressIOn, one could argue that this constitutes a lewd exhibition of the 
genitals". 
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The person is clearly displaying his or her genitals in a lewd manner. On the other 
hand, the person may have a neutral expression on his face but his genitals , which 
he is displaying, may be in a state of noticeable sexual excitement. Which is the 
correct interpretation to be attributed to the phrase "lewd exhibition of the genitals"? 
The Act does not answer this question. 
It is suggested that both interpretations be allowed. The reason behind this 
suggestion is that the aim of the Act is to protect children. One must look at the 
mischief that the Act is aimed at. The child who has an erection is serving the same 
purpose as the child who displays non-erect genitals with a suggestive look on his face . 
Both children, by their conduct, have the ability to cause sexual arousal in others. 
Judged by contemporary community standards, both scenarios would be disgusting 
because they depict children engaging in conduct which is far from childlike. It is 
submitted that the Act will be contravened as soon as there is a hint of lewdness in 
the depiction of a child. 
The Films and Publications Aces prohibits possession but does not specify whether 
such possession must have a commercial purpose. This is a decision which will have 
to be made at some time. In the United States of America the commercial purpose 
requirement led to the failure of legislation79 seeldng to destroy the industry by 
criminalising the production and commercial distribution of child pornography . In 
an article dealing with this issue it was suggested the " child pornography network can 




Section 2252 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation Act 18 US .C 
(1979) prohibited the knowing receipt, transportation or mailing in interstate 
commerce, for the purpose of sale or distribution fo r sale, of any obscene material 
which contained a child under the age of sixteen engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
31 
the profit, of paedophiles, who produce pornography for their own use" .80 The idea 
being conveyed was that the inclusion of a commercial purpose requirement in the 
Act8l had resulted from the incorrect assumption that pecuniary gain was what 
motivated child pornographers . The ultimate result was that the Act did not hone in 
on the source of the problem. It failed to protect children from those individuals who 
posed the greatest threat to them. 
It is submitted that the provision relating to child pornography in the Films and 
Publications Act82 should be interpreted so as to prohibit the possession of child 
pornography regardless of whether the material has been produced commercially and 
even if the possessor has no intention to distribute such material. This is the only 
way in which to give children the maximum amount of protection. Not much is 
known about South Mrica's child pornography industry. Whether this is due to the 
possible small size of the industry or to the clandestine nature of the industry is a 
question which cannot be answered. Some may argue that if the child pornography 
industry is very small in South Mrica there should be no need to interpret the Act 
widely. If we proceed on that assumption we run the risk of depriving children of the 
protection which the Legislature intended for them to have. Many paedophiles and 
collectors of child pornography will escape liability with ease. South Mrica will then 
find itself in a situation similar to that eArperienced in the United States of America 
where the statute failed to cover most of the child pornography industry. 
I t is submitted that regardless of which factor is responsible for our lack of knowledge 
about the industry, the solution remains the same. The truth is that we do not really 




Usa S. Smith, Private Possession of Ch ild Pornography: NarrowingAt-Home Priva0' Rights , 
1991 Annual SUlVey of American Law 1014. 
The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act 18 U.s.c. (1979). 
Supra. 
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could very well be run by paedophiles only. They could be using the pornographic 
material for personal pleasure and not for profit. On the other hand, the industry 
could provide a source of income for certain people, for example, hiring and/or 
exchanging of video tapes and magazines. In both scenarios children have suffered 
or been eA'Ploited somewhere along the way. In order for a person to possess child 
pornography, that material must have been produced by someone and a child/children 
would have been used in such production. Once again the harm suffered by children 
still forms part of the equation. This is what causes concern.83 In order to see results 
the provisions relating to child pornography will have to be interpreted widely. The 
prohibition of possession for both personal and commercial purposes will close all 
possible loopholes in the Act. 
What does "possession" in terms of the Films And Publications Act entail? The Act 
does not provide any guidance in this respect. Once again it will be left to the courts 
to decide exactly when a person may be said to be in possession of child pornography 
thereby contravening the Act. 84 The courts will be faced with the situations that 




In a report prepared by ECPAT (End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism) for the 
World Congress Against The Commercial Exploitation of Children it was stated that 
"law enforcement agents have found that a significant number of arrested child 
molesters are in possession of child pornography. One detective in the Los Angeles 
Police department estimated that of 700 child molesters arrested over ten years for 
child sex crimes, more than half had child pornography in their possession and about 
80% owned either child or adult pornography. From 1986 to 1988, an organisation 
called Childwatch in England found that of the 27 child molesters convicted, 23% 
were using their child victims to make pornography and nearly all of the child 
molesters had child pornography in their possession". 
Whiting, R.e. "The Unwilling Possesor of Pornography" (1971) 88 SAL] 296. 
1971 (3) SA 798 (T). R received an envelope containing two booklets of a 
pornographic nature. These booklets had been published in Sweden and were sent 
to R at his flat via ordinary mail. Upon opening the envelope R realised that it 
contained material of a pornographic nature and that the possession of such material 
w~s illegal. R suspecte~ that the booklets may have been sent to him as a joke by a 
fnend who was travellmg overseas . He considered destroying the booklets but 
(continued ... ) 
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a task of considerable difficulty for our courts. 8? In addition to this problem of 
interpretation we are now faced with the problem of implementation. The cases of 
S v R88 and S v Brick89 were decided at a time when South Africa did not have a 






( ... continued) 
eventually decided against it. Instead he decided to consult his lawyer. H e had to 
wait until the next morning to do that. In the meantime he placed the booklets in a 
wardrobe. The police arrived at his flat about an hour later and he immediately 
handed the booldets over to them. H e was charged and convicted of a contravention 
of section 2( 1) of Act 37 of 1967. 
On appeal Joubert J A came to the conclusion that the word "possession" in s2(1) of 
the 1967 Act was intended to mean "physical detention with the intention of the 
holder to exercise control for his own purpose or benefit". In respect of intention the 
learned judge found that the evidence showed that the appellant had no intention to 
exercise control over the booldets for his own purpose or benefit. This finding was 
based on appellant's evidence that he had wanted to get rid of the booldets the 
following day but that he had kept them temporarily in order to seek legal advice from 
his lawyer. The appeal succeeded. 
1973 (2) SA 571 (A). Upon B's return from a business trip the caretaker of his flat 
handed him an envelope saying that it had come from Copenhagen or Stocldlolm. 
Upon opening the envelope, B found that it contained two pamphlets and a book but 
no accompanying letter. He was taken by surprise as he had not ordered such 
material. H e showed it to his friend who also lived in the flat. He was exhausted from 
his trip so he went to bed. He overslept the next morning and he got to work late. 
Shortly after he reached home that evening the police arrived. He was charged and 
convicted of having been in possession of indecent or obscene matter in contravention 
of Act 37 of 1967. 
In S v Bricl, (supra) at page 579 the learned judge aclmowledged that "the precise 
meaning to be aSSigned to the word 'possession' occurring in a penal statute is often 
a matter of considerable difficulty. In the ultimate analysis, however, the decision 
vitally depends upon the intention of the Legislature as reflected in the context of the 
particular statutory enactment concerned". 
For further insight as to the problems experienced by our courts in defining the term 
"posseSSion", see: Rv Gumbi 1927 TPD 660 at 662; Rv Schulze 1943 TPD 7 at 9; R 
v Pule 1960 (2) SA 668; Rv Tsheleza 1931 SALJ 105; Rv J(oza 1933 TPD 204; R v 
Seboko and Another 1936AD 176;R v VanEy.;yk 1945 TPD 73;R v Kasamula 1945 
TPD 256; Rv J(eswa 1949 (3) SA3; R vAfrican Canning Co. (5. WA) Ltd. And Others 
1954 (1) SA 201H; R v de OUm 1957 (1) SA 158H;R v Smit andAnother 1958 (2) SA 
609H;R v Binns and Another 1961 (2) SA 107G-H;S v Smith 1965 (4) SA 171 D-E; 




certain issues then which would pose a great dilemma for courts today. In 
implementing a ban on possession, law enforcement officials have to tread carefully 
in order to ensure that fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Bill of Rights, are not 
violated. Of particular significance here is the right to privacy90 and the right to free 
speech and expression.91 Any ban on possession, including a ban on the possession 
of child pornography, will have to pass constitutional muster. 
In S v R n the court attributed a narrow meaning to the term "possession" but in S 
v Brick93 the opposite approach prevailed. The questions which arise now are: "how 
would South Mrican courts deal with this situation today? Would it be sufficient to 
find a person guilty of possessing child pornography in contravention of the Films and 
Publications Ace4 only if he has the intention to possess such material for his own use 
or purpose or would mere physical detention suffice? 
In S v Brice5 the court acknowledged the difficulty associated with the meaning of the 
term "possession". The answer, the majority felt, was to be found by inquiring as to 
the intention of the legislature. This was done and the court found that the objective 
of the Act was to prohibit the possession of indecent or obscene photographic matter. 
Having regard to this objective, Ogilvie Thompson C J was of the view that witting 
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Op Cit 580. On appeal Ogilvie Thomson C.J. made the following remarks: "in terms 
of the statute, the offence is committed by any person who 'has in his possession' any 
(continued ... ) 
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say that once it is shown that the holder was aware of the existence of such 
photographic in his detention, custody or control, it is not essential for a conviction 
that the State should prove that the holder intended to exercise control over the 
photographic matter for his own purpose or benefit. The learned judge admitted that 
this interpretation could lead to harsh results but that such harshness was ameliorated 
by section 3 of the Act which provided that no prosecution could be instituted except 
on the written authority of the Attorney-General or his designate. 
Jansen J A disagreed with the interpretation adopted by the majority.97 He felt that 
the interpretation was too wide and would lead to unconscionable results which 
parliament could not have intended. In his opinion, even recognition of the necessity 
for awareness of the nature of the pornographic matter being controlled, did not 
exclude the possibility of hard cases . The example that he uses in support of his 
96 
97 
( ... continued) 
indecent or obscene photographic matter as defined in sec. 1 (ii) and (iii) . Having 
regard to the obvious objective of Act, it appears to me that witting physical 
detention, custody or control of such matter...is penalised. Once it is shown that the 
holder was aware of the existence of such photographic matter in his detention, 
custody or control, it is not, in my view, essential for a conviction under sec. 2 (1) of 
the Act that the State should affirmatively prove that the holder intended to exercise 
control over the photographic matter in question for his own purpose or benefit". 
The learned judge was of the opinion that a contravention of the statute was 
established even if it be assumed in the appellant's favour that he innocently acquired 
the material in issue and that he intended to inform the police of their receipt and was 
only deterred from doing so because of his business worries. 
Jansen J.A., dissenting, felt that the term "possession" was being interpreted too 
Widely, thereby leading to unreasonable results. He remarked as follows on page 581: 
"a perusal of the Act does not, in my view, disclose the clear language required in the 
circumstances to indicate an intention by the legislature to throw its net so wide as to 
create unreasonable results. The word "possession" is used. In ordinary legal parlance 
this does not mean detention or custody or mere intentional physical control -words 
the legislature could easily have used had it so intended .. .In our law "possession" 
ordinarily connotes intentional physical control with, at least, the qualification that 
it is effected for one's own purpose or benefit, as stated, e.g., byVoet, 41.2.1., over 
200 years ago .. . .In the premises I am of the view that "possession" in sec. 2 (1) of the 
Act should not be read in a wide sense and should be tal<:en to bear its ordinary 
technical meaning of holding for one's own use or benefit, as held in S v R 1971 (3) 
SA 798 (T) . . 
36 
argument is that of a person who innocently purchases a magazine only to find that 
it contains indecent photographic matter. Such person, he argued, would not be able 
to dispose of the magazine without exercising that intentional physical which would 
lead to a contravention of the section. He explains how this purchaser could open the 
floodgates to contraventions of the section by other innocent people. In his opinion, 
even a police official to whom the magazine is handed over, will not escape liability 
since he will be exercising intentional physical control over the magazine containing 
obscene photographic matter. Any person who receives such material through the 
post will be equally guilty. It is thus clear that the interpretation adopted by the 
majority is problematic in certain respects. 
Jansen J A looked at the ordinary meaning of "possession" which is to exerClse 
intentional physical control for one's own purpose or benefit. He was of the opinion 
that the term "possession", as it appeared in the Act, should bear its ordinary legal 
meaning. This view accorded with that expressed by the court in S v R. 98 He 
aclmowledged that his approach would not solve the problem. entirely but that it 
would go a long way towards eliminating some of the hard cases that would otherwise 
arise. 
It is submitted that the approach adopted by the majority is understandable but 
unacceptable. It is understandable to the extent that it prevents a possessor from 
simply claiming that the obscene material in her possession did not belong to her or 
that she was simply holding it on behalf of someone else, thereby escaping liability. 
The approach of the majority ensures that every individual who acts as a conduit in 
the chain will be caught out. This sounds very tempting, especially in view of South 
Mrica's high crime rate, but it is not the solution that we are looking for. Even the 
learned judge's attempt to soften the blow, by pointing out that a prosecution could 
98 Supra. 
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not be instituted without the written authority of the Attorney-General, does not 
make his approach acceptable. There is still too much room for corruption and abuse 
of power. If we adopt the approach of the majority in S v Brick
99 
we are in effect 
casting the proscriptive net too wide. In so doing we leave the door open for the gross 
abuse of legislation which was intended to protect children and not to victimise 
innocent citizens. 
The approach adopted by Jansen J.A. is a much more practical approach than that 
adopted by the majority of the court. The merits of such an approach come to light 
in the area of child pornography . Firstly, the factual circumstances that arose in 
S v R 100 and in S v Brick10 1 can arise again. This approach will ensure that innocent 
individuals are not victimised. It may also allow certain individuals who are not all 
that innocent to escape punishment. It is submitted that such a consequence is more 









AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICAN CASES 
Introduction 
In this chapter the focus is on South Mrican cases dealing with pornography and 
privacy. None of the cases deal specifically with child pornography but the principles 
enunciated in these cases are extended to cover the area of child pornography where 
possible. The objective here is to determine how the attitude of the courts has 
changed recently and how they are likely to address the issue of child pornography. 
Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Securityl02 
Case and Another v Minister ofSafery and Securiry was South Mrica's first constitutional 
court case dealing with the issue of possession of pornographic matter. Patrick and 
Inga Case and Stephen Roy Curtis were found in possession of about 150 video 
cassettes containing sexually explicit matter. These cassettes had been seized by the 
police during a raid on the Case residence. Curtis was found in possession of 5 
similar cassettes, which were taken from him in the course of a police operation 
conducted in a shopping centre parking lot. All three were charged with the 
contravention of section 2(1) of the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act 
37 of 1967. The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court for a determination 
as to whether section 2 (1) was constitutional. 
Mokgoro J traced the history of South Mrican obscenity legislation with a view to 
highlighting its inadequacies and overt moralism. She decided the matter on the 
102 
Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 
1996 (1) SACR 587 (CC). 
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basis of a violation of section 15 of the Interim Constitution 103 - the freedom of 
speech, expression and artistic creativity. Her approach to the case differed markedly 
from that of the other judges who decided the matter on the basis of a violation of 
section 13 of the South Mrican Constitution - the right to privacy. Her statement 
on page 610 is of particular importance: 
"I have had the privilege of reading the admirably concise opinion of 
Didcott J. .... .I must agree with his conclusion that the 1967 Act 
unreasonably and unjustifiably infringes the constitutional right to 
privacy. I would, however, respectfully part company from Justice 
Didcott to the extent that any part of his opinion might be read to 
suggest that it is not in any circumstances the business of the State to 
regulate the kinds of expressive material an individual may consume in 
the privacy of her or his own home. It may be so that, as in England, 
a South Mrican's home is his (or her) castle. But I would hesitate to 
endorse the view that its walls are impregnable to the reach of 
governmental regulation affecting expressive materials." 
Mokgoro J was clearly not prepared to assume that the right to privacy was inviolable 
in every situation where people possess pornographic material. It is submitted that 
the learned judge obviously did not want to commit herself to anything which could 
backfire in the future. She ensured that the door to State intervention in the case 
of private possession would not be locked and the key thrown away. This approach 
was clearly adopted with great foresight. It leaves the door open for State 
intervention in certain cases, the most important of which is child pornography. 
It is submitted that the approach of the learned judge (who was in the minority) 
103 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
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leaves no room for possessors of child pornography to escape liability on 
constitutional grounds. This is important in view of the fact that the case in question 
did not deal specifically with the possession of child pornography. The learned judge 
was simply ensuring that the decision taken in this case would not prove to be an 
obstacle in future cases dealing with possession of se:h.'Ually explicit material. 
Didcott J based his decision on section 13 of the Interim Constitution104 - the right 
to privacy. He first looked at whether section 2 (1) clashed with section 13 of the 
interim constitution. In so doing he made the following comment: 
"what erotic material I may choose to keep within the privacy of my 
home, and only for my personal use there, is nobody's business but 
mine. It is certainly not the business of society or the State. Any ban 
imposed on my possession of such material for that solitary purpose 
invades the personal privacy which s 13 of the interim constitution 
guarantees that I shall enjoy."105 
He concluded that there was a clash between s2(1) of the Indecent and Obscene 
Photographic Matter Ace06 and s 13 of the interim constitution and that such 
infringement of the right to privacy was not reasonable and justifiable. 
The learned judge's express reference to possession for personal use is very interesting. 
He clearly drew a distinction between possession for personal use and possession for 
commercial purposes. It is respectfully submitted that this distinction would pose 
many problems for those seeking to prohibit the mere possession of child 
104 Act 200 of 1993. 
105 Op Cit 618 c-e. 
106 Supra. 
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pornography. As has been argued earlier, child pornography is harmful in many ways. 
Even a possessor who possesses child pornography for personal use can cause harm 
to children. Protection of children is our main objective and to achieve this objective 
possession per se will have to be prohibited. In the case of child pornography there 
should be no room for distinguishing between possession for personal use and 
possession for commercial purposes. To provide for such a distinction would simply 
amount to leaving a loophole in the system. It is admitted that this approach sounds 
draconian but the rationale behind it is not without merit. 
In the course of his judgment the learned judge dealt with the reasons advanced in 
favour of a ban on possession of pornographic material. One of the reasons was that 
the viewing of pornographic materials by possessors has a negative influence on them. 
This, it was argued, leads to the commission of sexual crimes by possessors. The 
learned judge correctly concluded that there exists no empirical evidence in support 
of such an argument. 
It was also argued by the State that a ban on the possession of pornographic material 
serves a useful purpose in curbing production. In effect the State was arguing that a 
ban on possession serves as a deterrent to consumers of pornographic material, 
thereby reducing the demand and ultimately decreasing production. It is submitted 
that the reasoning behind such argument is that of supply and demand. If there is 
no demand by possessors, there will be no scope for production. Mter all, it cannot 
be assumed that all possessors create their own pornographic materials or simply 
borrow it from their friends. Some of them are surely purchasing the materials either 
directly or indirectly from producers . These are the people who pose the greatest 
threat because they are the reason behind production. They keep the industry alive 
by creating a constant demand for pornographic materials. 
Didcott J agreed that "the production of pictures which exploited and degraded 
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women and children and of further types equally depraved, is certainly an evil and 
may well deserve to be suppressed. Perhaps as a means to that end, the same even 
goes for their possession, making it both reasonable and justifiable for society to mind 
the private business of its members" .107 Unfortunately, this point was not canvassed 
any further. However, the mere acknowledgment of such a possibility leaves the 
door open for State intervention in cases of possession of certain types of sexually 
explicit material. It is submitted that this approach, like that adopted by Mokgoro 
J, is flexible enough to ensure that child pornographers do not escape liability. 
Langa J was of the opinion that s2( l) of the Indecent and Obscene Photographic 
Matter Act was overbroad thereby allowing for the unwarranted and unjustifiable 
invasion of the right to personal privacy. lOB He commented on Justice Didcott's 
statement that possession for personal use within the privacy of the home is neither 
the business of society nor that of the State. Justice Langa noted that such statement 
was subject to the qualification that the right to privacy is not exempt from 
limitation. He was of the opinion that Justice Didcott acknowledged that such 
limitation may extend to possession even in the privacy of one's home in certain 
circumstances. 109 However, he offers no explanation as to what these circumstances 
are. It is submitted that child pornography is such a circumstance. 
Although the case itself did not deal with child pornography, Justice Madala saw fit 
to comment on that issue. The following passage from his judgment is relevant to the 
issue of child pornography: 
"While I agree that one's right to privacy should be respected, this, in 
my view, does not mean that all pornographic or similar material 
107 
108 
Op at 619 c-d. 
Op at 620 d-e. 
warrants protection under that right or even under the wing of free 
expression. There seems to be considerable consensus, both here and 
abroad, that some forms of pornography and obscene matter should not 
enjoy constitutional protection. In my view, children should not be 
exposed to or participate in the production of pornography .... .. However, 
possession by adults, in the privacy of their homes for personal viewing 
of sexually explicit erotica, portraying nudity, sexual interaction 
between consenting adults, without aggression, force, violence or abuse, 
may not be prohibited, for the benefit of those who derive pleasure in 
viewing such material. "110 
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The express reference to seA'Ual interaction between consenting adults is interesting. 
It is respectfully submitted that the learned judge was of the opinion that the right 
to privacy may be limited in cases of child pornography. This submission is based on 
the reasoning that if the learned judge had intended to protect child pornography he 
could have mentioned sexual interaction between consenting parties. Instead, he 
chose to use the phrase "sexual interaction between consenting adults". The only 
logical conclusion is that the learned judge did not see the possession of child 
pornography as a situation that warrants constitutional protection. 
The National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality v The Minister of Justice lll 
The recent constitutional court case of The National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian 
110 
111 
Op cit 622 f-h. 
The National Coalition For gqy And Lesbian Equality (First Applicant) and The South 
African Human Rights Commission (Second Applicant) v The Minister Of Justi ce (First 
R espondent), The minister Of Safety And Security (Second Respondent) and The Attornry-
General Of The Witwatersrand (Third R espondent) Case CCT 11/98 decided on 9 
October 1998. 
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Equality v The Minister of Justice 11 2 offers s?me insight into the approach of the court 
to the issue of privacy. Sachs J started by asking whether anti-sodomy laws punish 
the act or the person. He says that socially deviant behaviour is usually punished 
because it causes some kind of harm and not simply because it is deviant. Since the 
case deals with sodomy he says the following about homosexuality: "In the case of 
male homoseA'Uality, however, the perceived deviance is punished simply because it 
is deviant. It is repressed for its perceived symbolism rather than because of its 
proven harm. If proof were necessary, it is established by the fact that consensual 
anal penetration of a female is not criminalised. Thus, it is not the act of sodomy 
that is denounced by the law, but the so-called sodomite who performs it; not any 
proven social damage, but the threat that same-sex passion in itself is seen as 
representing to heterosexual hegemony". 113 
The above statement made by the learned judge raises some interesting questions 
which can be extended to the area of child pornography. Firstly, what does anti-child 
pornography legislation punish? Does it indirectly punish paedophiles because 
paedophilia creates the impression that children are legitimate sexual partners or does 
it attempt to protect children from harm? The answer, especially in a society as 
diverse as South Mrican society, is not simple. There is a possibility that the Films 
and Publications Act 114 is indirectly aimed at punishing paedophiles. It was suggested 
in parliament that the Act will result in "a greater clampdown on paedophiles and 
distributors of pornography". 115 It is submitted that this does not mean that the Act 
is specifically aimed at paedophiles. Paedophiles are certainly more likely to be 
affected by this piece of legislation because they are likely collectors of child 
112 Supra. 
113 Op Cit Para [108] . 
114 Supra. 
115 Hansard, Debates of the Senate, 3rd session, 1st Parliament, 8 to 10 October 1996. 
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pornography. (No other group has been identified with more certainty as collectors 
of child pornography). 
The Act cannot be branded as a piece of legislation which attacks paedophiles in an 
underhanded way. There can be no denying that the Act does affect paedophiles but 
this is certainly not its primary objective. It is therefore possible that the Act is in 
fact aimed at protecting children but in so doing it affects paedophiles . If this is the 
case there can be no objection to the Act on the basis that it punishes a person rather 
than action. 
Itis submitted that the anti-child pornography legislationl1 6 is different from the anti-
sodomy laws in the sense that the former has a bona fide objective of protecting 
children. This submission is based on much of what was said when this Act was being 
debated in Parliament. 11 7 Those debates reflect the motives behind the promulgation 
of this piece of legislation. One of the points noted in Parliament was that the Act 
is not about censorship but about the protection of basic human rights, particularly 
the protection of children. 118 The African National Congress was of the view that 
the Act does not attempt to regulate morals but to protect those who are vulnerable, 
namely, women and children.119 Despite the skepticism of a few of the political 
parties regarding the Act, the protection of children was a concern shared by all. 
In paragraph [116] Sachs J. says that "there is no good reason why the concept of 
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in the bedroom ... ... that you may behave as bizarrely or shamefully as you like, on the 
understanding that you do so in private". He makes an important point that "what 
is crucial is the nature of the activity, not its site" .120 These comments by the learned 
judge can once again be extended to the area of child pornography. It helps to a 
certain extent to alleviate the harshness of the statement made by Didcott J. in the 
Case 12 1 judgment where he said, "what erotic material I may choose to keep within 
the privacy of my home, and only for my personal use there, is nobody's business but 
mine. It is certainly not the business of society or the State". 122 
The emphasis on the nature of a particular activity rather than the place where it 
occurs is important. To adopt the opposite stance would amount to saying that a 
person can do anything he pleases in the privacy of his home without state 
intervention. In the words of Sachs J. , "there is no reason why the concept of privacy 
should be extended to give blanket libertarian permission for people to do anything 
they like provided that what they do is sexual and done in private". 123 It is submitted 
that it is only logical to focus on the type of activity being engaged in before making 
any comment. 






Child pornography is often associated with the sexual exploitation of 
Para 117 of the judgment. 
Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 
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October 1998 at para [118]. 
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children. 124 This is what calls for action. It is irrelevant whether acts associated with 
child pornography take place in public or in private. At the end of the day children 
still suffer harm. 125 The overall point being made here is that the Films and 
Publications Act 126 prohibits possession of child pornography because such possession 
is linked to harm. This is regardless of whether it is private possession for personal 
use or possession for commercial purposes . 
Sachs J uses the examples of sex involving violence, deception, voyeurism, intrusion 
or harassment where "the privacy interest is overcome because of the perceived 
harm" .1 27 It is submitted that the threat posed by child pornography to the well-
being of children is sufficient to overcome the privacy interest. One cannot begin to 
compare the harm suffered by children through child pornography with the feelings 
of a person whose privacy has been invaded. Most South Africans may not even 
tolerate such a comparison because of the threat that it poses to our recently acquired 
freedom. This attitude has already been adopted by one writer and academic who 
feels that "the spectre of the past.. .. where police would go through one's private 
library in search of what may possibly be undesirable, is to my mind so abominable 
that the mere fact of possession of child pornography simply does not justify any 
invasion". 128 
It is respectfully submitted that the attitude described above will lead to an even 
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almost every situation but this should not stop us from doing what is necessary to 
. protect children. The potential for abuse in this particular situation is reduced by 
section 27(3) of the Films and Publications Act129 which provides that "no 
prosecution shall be instituted in respect of a contravention of subsection (1), 130 and 
no search warrant shall be issued in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 
no. 51 of 1977), in respect of a publication or film which may be involved in such 
a contravention, without the written authority of the attorney-general concerned". 
On the other hand, it is submitted that s27(3) of the Films and Publications Act is 
not practical as it does provide for those situations where the police may have to act 
immediately so as not to defeat the object of their search. It is therefore submitted 
that a better approach would be to allow magistrates to issue search warrants if there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that a person has pornographic material in his 
or her possession. This warrant should authorise both search and seizure. In 
addition, police officers should be allowed to search and seize without a warrant if 
they have no option but to tal<.e immediate action. In other words, it is submitted 
that the law relating to search and seizure, as provided for by the Criminal Procedure 
Act131 should apply to the Films and Publications Ace32 as well. The written 
authority of the attorney-general should not be a requirement as it may render the 
Films and Publications Act less effective than it would otherwise be in the fight 






Supra. Subsection (1) prohibits the production, importation and possession of films 
and publications depicting children under the age of eighteen participating in, 
engaging in or assisting another person to engage in sexual conduct or a lewd display 
of nudity. 
Section 21 of the Criminal Procedural Act 51 of 1977. 
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POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
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In this chapter the approaches of other countries to the burning issue of the 
possession of child pornography are investigated. The objective is to determine why 
other countries have seen fit to criminalise the possession of child pornography. 
Cases and legislation are dealt with here. It is important to look at the ways in which 
other countries have addressed this problem since it gives us some idea as to how far 
governments are willing to go to root out this vile practice. 
United States of America 
The first case (Stanlry v Georgia)133 is analysed with a view to determining the 
approach of American courts to private possession of offensive material. This case 
does not deal specifically with child pornography but with the possession of obscene 
material in general. The objective here is to see how far the American courts have 
come and why they chose the path that they did. This can only be done by tracing 
the case law back to where the controversy surrounding the issue of possession began. 
The Protection of Children Against Sexual eJl..'P1oitationActof 1977 134 prohibited the 
production, distribution, and sale of material depicting sexually explicit conduct by 
minors. It also criminalized the mailing, receipt, or trafficking in interstate or foreign 
commerce of such material for the purpose of sale or distribution. The Act did not, 
however, prohibit possession. This Act was a failure as was clear from the report of 
133 394 US 557 (1969). 
134 Pub. L 95-225,92 stat 7. 
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the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography in 1976. 135 The report stated 
that in spite of the enactment of the 1977 Act approximately 264 commercial 
magazines depicting children in sexual poses continued to be produced each month 
and 300 000 children continued to be sexually exploited each year in the United 
States. 
The Child Protection Act of 1984 136 revised the 1977 Act. It removed the 
requirement that trafficldng, receipt, and mailing be for the purposes of sale or 
distribution for sale. This made it possible to prosecute those individuals (especially 
paedophiles) who traded child pornography for self-gratification rather than for profit 
The Act also removed the requirement that material be obscene before its production, 
distribution, sale, mailing, trafficldng, and receipt could be found criminal. The age 
limit was raised from sixteen to eighteen years. Once again, Congress did not find it 
necessary to include a prohibition against possession of child pornography. The Act 
did make it possible to halt the non-commercial aspect of the child pornography 
industry. The Act was further amended in 1986 and 1988 but not to include the 
criminalization of possession. 137 
Stanlry v Georgia, 138 the first American case in which the private possession of obscene 
materials was fully considered, dealt specifically with the state's attempt to regulate 
the private possession of obscene films. The defendant was tried and convicted in the 
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Georgia statute.139 The obscene matter in question consisted of films which a state 
officer seized after federal and state agents had found them in a desk drawer in a 
bedroom of the defendant's home. The lower court held that a charge for the 
possession of obscene matter did not require that such possession must have been 
with intent to sell, expose or circulate same. The main argument on behalf of the 
State was that since the State can protect the body of a citizen it can protect his 
mind. 
On appeal the United States Supreme Court held that the Georgia statute, insofar as 
it made mere private possession of obscene matter a crime, was unconstitutional. 
Justice Marshall said that: 
"the difficulties of proving an intent to distribute obscene matter or in 
producing evidence of actual distribution, under statutory schemes 
prohibiting the distribution of obscene matter, which difficulties might 
exist if a statutory prohibition of mere possession of obscene matter is 
not upheld, do not justify an infringement resulting from this latter 
prohibition, of an individual's right to read or observe what he 
pleases .. . " . 14o It was made quite clear that "the broad power of the 
States to regulate obscenity does not extend to mere possession of 




The relevant section of the statute, Ca Code Ann §26-630 1 (Supp 1968), reads as 
follows: "Any person who shall knowingly bring or cause to be brought into this state 
for sale or exhibition, or who shall knowingly sell or offer t o sell , or who shall 
knowingly lend or give away or offer to lend or give away, or who shall knOWingly 
have possession of, or who shall knowingly exhibit or transmit to another, any obscene 
matter, or who shall knowingly advertise for sale by any form of notice, printed, 
written, or verbal, any obscene matter, or who shall knowingly manufacture, draw, 
duplicate or print any obscene matter with intent t o sell , expose or circulate the same, 
shall, if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature 
of such matter, be gUilty of a felony ... " 
Op cit 544 . 
Op cit 545. 
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In essence the court was saying that the State may not dictate what printed or visual 
materials a person may possess in his own home for his personal use. In the words 
of Justice Marshall: 
" ... a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, 
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole 
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the 
power to control men's minds" . 142 This statement was made in response 
to the State's argument that a ban on private possession was necessary 
in order to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. 
The court rejected this argument as amounting to nothing more than 
the assertion that the State has a right to control the moral content of 
a person's thoughts. "143 
The court said : 
"given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit 
mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to 
antisocial conduct than it may prohibit the possession of chemistry 
books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of 
homemade spirits. "144 




Op cit 550. 
In reaching this conclusion the judge relied on the following passage: "Communities 
believe, and act on the belief, that obscenity is immoral, is wrong for the individual, 
and has no place in a decent society. They believe too that adults as well as children 
are corruptible in morals and character and that obscenity is a source of corruption 
that should be eliminated. Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection 
of others. Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the community and for the 
~al:a~,ion and wel!are of the consumer. Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity 
1S sm. - Henkm, M orals and the Constitution: The Sin ojObscenity, 1963 Col L Rev. 
391,395 . 
Op cit 550. 
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such as classified national security materials could still be penalised because of the 
harm that it could cause. Obscenity possessed for personal use was not seen to fall 
into this category and the prohibition of such materials would be unconstitutional. 
The court dismissed arguments that the regulation of obscene materials is justified by 
the harm to consumers or persons depicted in such material. 
It is submitted that the court's comparison between the possession of chemistry books 
and obscene materials cannot be extended to cover child pornography. The reason 
for this is simply that child pornography entails exploitation, degradation and 
physical or psychological (or both) right from the production stage. Even if a 
possessor of child pornography does not use it to harm others there will still be a 
reason for a ban on possession. This reason, which has already been discussed earlier, 
is that the possessor provides a market for the producer. The possessor purchases the 
material and becomes a link in the chain. Chemistry books, on the other hand, can 
lead to harm only if the possessor chooses to use the information contained therein 
in a harmful way. There is usually no harm to anyone during production. It is 
submitted that the difference lies in the nature of the two types of material compared 
by the court. 
New York v Ferber145 dealt with a New York statute prohibiting persons from 
knowingly promoting a se:A.'Ual performance by a child under the age of sixteen. In 
this case the proprietor of a bookstore was convicted of selling films depicting young 
boys masturbating. The United States Supreme Court held that child pornography 
is not protected speech and based its decision on the harm suffered by children as a 
result of being used in the production of pornographic material. The court did not 
see a need to address the issue of possession of child pornography because the New 
York statute did not prohibit possession. 
145 Supra. 
54 
This case is significant because of its influence on other American states with regard 
to the enactment of legislation prohibiting the possession of child pornography. 
Eighteen states took their cue from the State of New York and enacted legislation 
prohibiting the possession of child pornography regardless of whether there was an 
intention to distribute or not. 146 These eighteen States made possession of child 
pornography an offence with a penalty as serious as that imposed in respect of 
distribution. These States did not, however, explicitly ban private possession. 
Despite this, possessors of child pornography were tried and convicted for private 
possession. 147 
In State v Meadows 148 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a conviction for possession of 
child pornography. In this case police officers searched Meadows' hotel room and 
found magazines depicting children engaging in sexual activity. The Supreme Court 
of Ohio started its inquiry by looking at the reasoning in Stanlry v Georgia. 149 In so 
doing the court noticed that in Stanley's case the court had declined to state whether 
compelling reasons existed to justify the criminalizing the possession of non-obscene 
materials. The Meadows court used this and the state interests set forth in New York 
v Ferber1SO to justify criminalising the possession of child pornography. The court 
found that permitting possession of child pornography was of "trifling" social value1s 1 







These states were Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Washington, West Virginia. 
State v Meadows 480 U.S. 936 (1987); Ex Parte Felton 526 So.2d 638 Ala. (1988); 
People v Geever 488 U.S. 920 (1988); Savery v State 819 U.W. 2d 837 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1991); State v Davis 53 Wash. App. 768 p. 2d 499 (Wash. App. 1989). 
Supra. 
394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
Op cit 703. 
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individual interest. "152 
A similar provision was upheld in the State of Alabama in the case of Ex Parte 
Felton.153 Felton was convicted of privately possessing a sexually explicit film 
depicting minors. The court did not rely on Stanley 's154 case because that case dealt 
with obscenity and not with child pornography. The court followed the decision in 
State v Meadows 155 and upheld the law prohibiting possession of child pornography. 
In the State of Illinois an anti-possession statute came under the spotlight in People 
v Geever.156 The court reviewed the decision in Stanlry v Georgia157 and came to the 
conclusion that the State's interest in protecting children outweighed an individual's 
right to sanctuary in his own home. In Texas a similar conviction was upheld in 
Savery v State158 and in Washington a conviction was upheld in State v Davis. 159 The 
Illinois and Ohio courts found that the harm to the child used in the production and 
distribution of child pornography outweighed an individual's privacy interest in 
possessing such material privately for personal use . 
It is submitted that the approach adopted by the Illinois and Ohio courts is the 
correct approach because it focuses on the reason behind the ban on possession of 
child pornography. The reason advanced by these courts for upholding a ban on 
152 Op cit 704. 
153 526 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1988) . 
154 Supra. 
155 480 U.S. 936 (1 987) . 
156 488 U.S. 920 (1988). 
157 Supra. 
158 819 S.W . 2d 837 (Tex. Crim.App. 199 1). 
159 768 P. 2d 499 (Wash. App. 1989). 
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possession of child pornography, namely, the prevention of harm to children, is not 
based merely on morality and emotion. These courts looked at the situation 
rationally and practically and in so doing they found the reason for a ban on 
possession. There can be no denying that arguments in favour of prohibiting child 
pornography often amount to nothing more than emotional outbursts. The reasons 
advanced are often based on protection of readers and viewers from the so-called 
negative influence of pornography. The Illinois and Ohio courts differed in their 
approach, which, it is submitted, is the correct one. 
Osbome v Ohio160 dealt with the possession of photographs depicting nude minors. In 
terms of an Ohio statute it was illegal for a person to possess or view any material 
depicting a minor, who is not such person's child or ward, in a state of nudity. 
Osborne was found in possession of four photographs of a nude male adolescent in 
sexually explicit positions. The court was faced with a combination of the situations 
in Stanlry v Georgia 161 and that in New York v Ferber. 162 In Stanley's case the court 
recognised the individual's right to privacy whilst in Ferber's163 case the court 
recognised the State's right to regulate child pornography. In this case the court was 
faced with the private possession of child pornography. The private possession of 
child pornography encompasses the individual's privacy right because it deals with 
possession in the private sphere. It also encompasses the State's right to step in 
because of the very nature of child pornography. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the State's proscription of the possession 
of child pornography was not unconstitutional because the State did not rely on a 





paternalistic interest in regulating a person's mind, but rather sought to serve a 
compelling state interest in protecting the victims of child pornography. In 
concluding that the State may constitutionally proscribe the possession of child 
pornography the court considered the following arguments advanced by the State: 
(1) the State's interest in protecting the victims of child pornography is so great 
that it may legitimately attempt to eliminate the industry at all levels in the 
distribution chain; 
(2) since the decision in New York v Ferber164 much of the child pornography 
market had been driven underground, making it to difficult to eliminate the 
industry by only attacking production and distribution. This argument was 
supported by the fact that since that decision nineteen States found it 
necessary to prohibit the possession of child pornography; 165 
(3) the materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim's 
abuse and causes the victims lifelong harm by haunting them; 166 
(4) the State's ban on possession encourages possessors of child pornography to 
destroy such material. 
(5) it is good to encourage the destruction of pornographic material because 
paedophiles use such material to seduce other children into sexual activity. It 
has been suggested that paedophiles use child pornography to induce children 






See n. 97 supra for the first eighteen States which enact ed legislation t o ban the 
possession of child pornography . Since then Alabama has been added to the list: Ala. 
Code §1 3A-12-192 (1988). 
Shields v Gross 448 N.E 2d 108 , 112 (N.Y. 1983). 
Josephine Potuto, Stanlry + Ferber = The Constitutional Crime of At-Home Child 
Pornography Possession, (1987-88) 76 Ky. 1.]. 15 , 26 . 
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography , Final Report 600, at page 649. 
Osborne v Ohio 495 D.S. 103 (1990) at 111. 
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paedophile uses a process similar to systematic desensitization utilised by 
psychologists in treating behaviour disorders. 168 First the paedophile may 
allow the child to browse through a magazine containing mild depictions of a 
sexual nature, such as hugging and kissing. Once the child is comfortable with 
these, the paedophile may introduce the child to more explicit depictions, 
such as sexual intercourse between adults. This progresses to the point where 
the child is shown pictures and films depicting sexual activity between adults 
and children and even homose}"''Ual activity. By this time it is highly likely that 
the child would not feel inhibited. 
The Supreme Court decided that the State's interest in prohibiting the private 
possession of child pornography overrode the individual's right to privacy. In 
Stanley's case the court allowed the State of Georgia to proscribe the circulation of 
obscene material but did not extend this proscription to the private possession of 
obscene materials. The most important difference between Stanlry v Georgia 169and 
Osborne v Ohio170 is that the former dealt with obscene material whilst the latter dealt 
with child pornography. In Stanley's case the court did not accept the State's 
argument that a prohibition on possession would dry up the market for obscene 
materials but in Osborne's case the court accepted this argument. 
I t is clear from the approach adopted by the American courts that statutes prohibiting 
possession of child pornography have passed constitutional muster. What is 
admirable about the American approach is the fact that it regards the protection of 




Attorney General's Final Report, see n. 88 supra, at 604; Robert J. Clinton, Child 
Protection Act of 1984 - Enforceable Legislation to Prevent Sexual Abuse of Children, 
(1985) 10 Okla. City u.L. Rev. atl32 . 
Supra. 
495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
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Canada 
The possession of child pornography is an offence in Canada in terms of section 
163.1 of the Criminal Code. The Canadian Supreme Court has adopted a different 
approach to pornography from that adopted in the United States of America. The 
Canadians have adopted a standard based solely on the harm believed to be 
engendered by sexually explicit material. The Americans , on the other hand, have 
adopted an approach based on a public-morality consideration. 
In the case of Ontario (Attorn ey General) v Langer171 court was faced with the issue of 
whether certain drawings and paintings fell within the definition of child 
pornography, the production and distribution of which were prohibited by the 
Canadian Criminal Code. The paintings and sketches which were seized from an art 
gallery depicted explicit sexual relations between adults and children. McCombs J 
found that s 163. 1 of the Criminal Code violated the freedom of expression 
guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.l72 This violation was, 
however, found to be justified in terms of section 1 of the Charter. 173 At pp. 325 -
26 of the judgment the learned judge stated: 
" ... on the basis of the opinion evidence which I have accepted, private 
possession of child pornography poses a realistic risk of harm to children 
by reinforcing cognitive distortions, fuelling fantasies, and its potential 
use in "grooming" possible child victims. It is entirely reasonable and 




(1 995) 97 c.c.c. (3d) 290 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div). 
Section 2 (b) of the Charter. 
Section 1 of the Charter provides as follows: "the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society". 
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possession of child pornography." 
Despite the above statement, the court held that the depictions had artistic melit and 
did not pose a realistic risk of harm to children. The court accordingly ordered that 
the paintings and sketches be returned to the person from whom they had been 
seized. 
The most recent Canadian case dealing with the possession of child pornography is 
that of Rv Sharpe. 174 In April 1995 several computer discs, books, manusclipts and 
photographs were seized from the accused at his home. Many of the seized 
photographs were of nude boys displaying their genitals or anal regions. The 
computer disks contained a text entitled "Sam paloc's Flogging, Fun and Fortitude-
A Collection of IGddiekink Classics" . Some of the seized items were intended for 
resale whilst others were not. The accused challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality 
of section 163.1 (4) of the Criminal Code which provides as follows: 
(4) "Every person who possesses any child pornography is guilty of: 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction." 
It was pointed out that the word "possess" is not limited. The inevitable consequence 
is that any purpose will suffice to make possession of child pornography a crime. 
Subsection 4 was contrasted with subsections 2 175 and 3 176 which prohibit possession 
174 
175 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, Docket X050427, 13 January 1999 . 
Subsection 2 prOVides as follows: 
"Every person who makes, prints, publishes or possesses for the purpose of 
publication any child pornography, is guilty of: 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
(continued ... ) 
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for purposes of publication, sale or distribution. 
The Crown conceded that subsection 4 of the Criminal Code violates the guarantee 
of freedom of expression set out in section 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Justice Shaw had to decide whether such violation was justified under 
section 1 of the Charter. In deciding this issue the learned judge referred to 
Langer's177 case discussed above. He pointed out that the section 1 analysis in 
Langer's case consisted of the weighing of the legislative objectives against the effects 
of the legislation. He was of the opinion that this test was too narrow and that a 
better approach was that adopted in Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 178 
In the Dagenais case Lamer e.J.e. stated that in certain cases it is appropriate to 
weigh the salutary effects of legislation against its deleterious effects. Justice Shaw 
adopted that approach in the present case. He weighed the deleterious effects against 
the salutary effects of the prohibition of simple possession of child pornography. 
The learned judge found that the detrimental effects substantially outweighed the 
salutary effects. He was of the opinion that the intrusion into freedom of expression 
and the right of privacy is so profound that it is not outweighed by the limited 
beneficial effects of the prohibition. He said that the simple possession prohibition 





( ... continued) 
years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction." 
Subsection 3 provides as follows: 
"Every person who imports, distributes , sells or possesses for the purpose of 
distribution or sale arly child pornography, is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction." 
Supra. 
[1994] 94 c.c.c. (3d) 289 (S.c.c.). 
62 
be given considerable weight. Accordingly he found that the limited effectiveness of 
the prohibition was insufficient to warrant its highly invasive effects. In arriving at 
this conclusion the judge took into account that the Criminal Code contains what he 
considered to be powerful measures to tackle the problem of harm to children arising 
from pornography. The outcome of this case was that subsection 4 is in violation of 
section 2 (b) of the Charter and is not justified under section 1 of the Charter. 
Accordingly, subsection 4 was declared null and void and the accused was acquitted 
of charges brought under that section. 
This is a highly controversial decision which has caused a public outcry in Canada. 
The decision is being appealed against by the provincial government. 
Other Countries 
Many other countries have also penalised the possession of child pornography. In 
July 1994 the Austrian government amended the Penal Code179 to prohibit the 
possession of child pornography. Initially legislation in the Netherlands prohibited 
the manufacture, dissemination, transport and export of pornography involving 
children under the age of sixteen. In April 1995 the government passed legislation 
amending the Penal Code180 and maldng it an offence to posse~s pornographic 
material involving children under the age of sixteen. In 1992 Norway's Penal Code 
was amended to include a prohibition on possession of child pornography. The 
possession of child pornography is an offence in Germany . 181 Both countries prohibit 
the mere possession of child pornography. In England and Wales it is an offence for 
a person to have even one indecent photograph of a child in his possession with a 
179 Section 207 a was amended. 
180 Penal Code Art. 240b, Section 1. 
181 German Penal Code § 184 Abs. 5 StGB (Strafgesetzbuch). 
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view to distributing or showing it. 182 The European countries distinguish between 
possession for distribution and possession for personal use. 183 In Cambodia, a draft 
proposal184 for a law against child exploitation includes a provision which prohibits 
the production, possession, importation, exportation or advertisement of material 
depicting persons under the age of eighteen in an indecent, obscene or derogatory 
manner. None of the Eastern European countries, with the exception of Estonia, 185 
have laws specifically dealing with child pornography. 
One cannot help noticing the change in attitude towards child pornography all 
around the world. It is about time that governments realised the impact of child 
pornography, as well as other crimes against children, on the quality of life of 
children. The steps being taken by these countries are exactly what is needed to 





Section 1(1) of the Protection of Children Act 1978. 
Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
Criminal code art. 228 (U.S.S .R.) - prohibits possession of pornographic materials 
for sale or distribution. 
Penal Code art. 528, Royal Decree No. 1398 (It.) - prohibits possession of obscene 
publications for purposes of commerce or distribution. 
Penal Code art. 283 (Fr.) - prohibits possession of publications contrary to good 
morals for purposes of commerce, distribution or display. 
Law on the Abolition of Child Trafficking and Prostitution, Art 9A i, ii, iii. 




The reality of the South Mrican situation is laid bare in this chapter. Will the issue 
of child pornography continue to be overshadowed by other problems such as 
hunger, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and violence as often seems to happen in 
developing countries 186 or will South Mrica rise to the occasion by giving the problem 
of child pornography the attention it requires? 
It is clear from the discussion in chapter five above that many countries regard child 
pornography as a very serious problem which can no longer be swept under the 
carpet. In certain countries the industry has wreaked such havoc in the lives of 
children that the mere possession of child pornography has now been banned. 
Poverty and desperation have led parents to sell their children into a life of 
prostitution and all other evils associated with it187 . There is no reason to think that 
South Mrica is any different. South Mrica is plagued by poverty, unemployment and 
crime. There is also a growing number of street children. It is submitted that this 
combination of circumstances provides fertile ground for the growth of industries 
which eArploit children, namely, child prostitution and child pornography. 
During the course of this work many arguments in favour of prohibiting the 
possession of child pornography have been advanced. These arguments have not, 
however, taken into account the prevailing conditions in which the prohibition is to 
operate. The South Mrican government has an overwhelming number of problems 
186 
187 
This is a reality that was highlighted by the international non-governmental 
organisation, End Child Prostitution inAsian Tourism (ECPAT) , in a paper prepared 
for the World Congress against the Commercial Exploitation of Children, which was 
held in Stockholm, Sweden from 27 -31 August 1996. 
Crime, pornography, child labour. 
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to attend to. Crime, poverty and illiteracy are just a few of the major problems 
facing this country. In view of this reality there are certain questions which demand 
answers, namely, "where exactly does the prevention of child pornography fit into the 
government's list of priorities or is it even a priority? Does the government intend 
to enforce the provisions of the new Act or are they merely paying lip-service to the 
protection of children? Does the government have the resources to enforce the 
prohibition on possession?" It is submitted that in attempting to follow international 
trends and to show our commitment to children's rights we should not forget the 
enormity of other problems facing us. 
With regard to the first question the answer must be in the affirmative. Every 
government should place children at the very top of its list of priorities. To do any 
less would amount to denying children the protection they deserve. As mentioned 
in chapter one, South Africa is trying very hard to develop a children's rights culture. 
The second question cannot be answered at this stage as it is too soon after the 
coming into effect of the new Act to be able to see results. The last question is the 
one that causes the most concern. It is highly unlikely that the country has the 
resources to implement the prohibition on possession of child pornography. The 
crime rate in this country is appalling and the police already have their hands full. 
It is submitted that the answer lies in a combination of proper law enforcement and 
community effort. This is no time to turn a blind eye to child pornography or to 
other problems facing children. There can be no denying that financial constraints 
will prove to be an obstacle. It is therefore incumbent upon the South African 
community at large to stop exploiting children. This is only part of the bigger picture. 
What about the health of the children depicted in these pornographic materials? 
Does it not follow as a matter of logic that they should be provided with some sort 
of support and counselling? This is , however, not likely in this country. Our child 
protection and child welfare systems are already being stretched to the limit. There 
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is a lack of manpower and severe financial constraints. As the need for child 
protection services continues to grow the situation becomes more hopeless. There 
is a severe shortage of specialised services such as counselling and psychological 
treatment for traumatised children. 
The Legislature's intentions in drafting the Films and Publications Ace
ss 
are indeed 
worthy of praise. The Act, as it appears on paper, is a wonderful instrument for the 
protection of children. This does not mean that the Act will work in practice. If the 
Act does not prove workable, such failure will not be due to any shortcomings on the 
part of the Legislature. 
There is no doubt that a prohibition on the possession of child pornography is going 
to spark many constitutional debates. These will be especially in respect of private 
possession; possession without a commercial rationale; and the absence of an 
exemption in cases where the prohibited material has artistic, dramatic, literary, 
scientific or documentary value. It is also possible that the sections dealing with 
possession will be challenged as being too wide. These problems are anticipated and 
cannot be avoided. 
South Mrica has come a long way but still has a long way to go in establishing a 
children's rights culture. The promulgation oflegislation is just one little step in the 
right direction. The answer to the problem of child pornography lies in the proper 
interpretation and enforcement of such legislation. 
At the end of this journey into the world of child pornography the inevitable 
conclusion is that the prohibition on the possession of child pornography is not 
legislative overkill but a justifiable means to a worthy end. 
188 No. 6S of 1996. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Statutes 
1. Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972. 
2. Films and Publications Amendment Bill 35 of 1999. 
3. Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996. 
4. Indecent and Obscene Photographic Matter Act 37 of 1967 (repealed). 
5. Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
6. Publications and Entertainment Act 26 of 1963 (repealed). 
7. Publications Act 42 of 1974 (repealed). 
8. Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 
9. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
Cases 
1. Case v Minister of Safety and Security; Curtis v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 
(1) SACR 587 (CC). 
2. Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [1994] 94 CCC (3d) 289 
(S.CC). 
3. Ex Parte Felton 526 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1988). 
4. New York v Ferber 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
5. Ontario (Attornry General) v Langer [1995] 97 CCC (3d) 290 (Ont. Ct. Gen. 
Div.). 
6. Osborne v Ohio 495 U.S. 103 (1995). 
7. People v Geever 488 U.S. 920 (1988). 
8. Pope v Illinois 481 US 497 (1987). 
9. R v African Canning Co. (5. WA) Ltd and Others 1954 (1) SA 201. 
10. R v Amies 1930 TPD 151. 
11. R v Binns and Another 1961 (2) SA 107. 
68 
12. R v Butler [1992] 8 CR.R.(2d) l. 
13 . R v De Beer 1943 TPD 1. 
14. R v De Olim 1957 (1) SA 158. 
15. R v Gumbi 1927 TPD 660. 
16. R v Kasamula 1945 TPD 256. 
17. Rv Keswa 1949 (3) SA 3. 
18. Rv Koza 1933 TPD 204. 
19. R v Mannheim 1943 TPD 169. 
20. Rv Meinert 1932 SWA 56. 
21. R v Pule 1960 (2) SA 668. 
22. R v Schulze 1 943 TPD 7. 
23. Rv Seboko and Another 1936 AD 176. 
24. Rv Sharpe (B.CS.C) 13 January 1999, Docket no.: X050427. 
25. Rv Smit and Another 1958 (2) SA 609. 
26. Rv Tsheleza 1931 SALJ 105. 
27 . R v Van Ewyk 1945 TPD 73. 
28. R v W 1953 (3) SA 52 (SWA). 
29. SvBrick 1972 (4) SA571 (A). 
30. S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513 (A). 
31 . S v Film Fun Holdings (Ply) Ltd and Others 1977 (2) SA 377 (E) . 
32. S v H 1974 (3) SA 405 (T) . 
33. S v Mjoli 1968 (3) SA 397 (T) . 
34. S v Nunes 1975 (4) SA 929 (T) . 
35. S v R 1 97 1 (2) SA 470 (T). 
36. S v Skosana 1973 (1) SA 322. 
37. S v Smith 1965 (4) SA 17l. 
38. Savery v State 819 S.W. 2d 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 
39. SUid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie v O'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394. 
40. Shields v Gross 448 N.E.2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1983) . 
69 
41. Stanley v Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
42. State v Meadows 480 U.S. 936 (1987). 
43. State v Davis 768 P.2d 499 (Wash. App. 1989). 
44. United States v X-Citement Video Inc., et a1513 U.S. (1994). 
45. United States of America v Ronald, Renee Kantor et al. 677 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987). 
Iournal Articles 
1. Azimov, B. "Proscribing the Private Possession of Child Pornography: Is it Legislative 
Overkill?" (1991) 12 Journal of Juvenile Law 91. 
2. Bicknell, B.A. "The Age of Majority" (1967) 117:2 NLJ 955. 
3. Boberg, P.Q.R. "Vignettes from the law reports: Trouble with Breasts" (1988) 17 BL 
105. 
4. Burke, P.A. "United States v X-Citement Video Inc. [115 S. Ct 464 (1994)): 
stretching the limits of statutory interpretation?" (1996) 56 La. 1. Rev. 937. 
5. Burns, Y. M. "The Publications Act: production of an undesirable publication or object" 
(1980) 43 THRHR 267. 
6. Cretney, S. "Eighteen or Twenty-One Legal Consequences" (1970) 120: 1 NLJ 144 
7. Daniel, S. "Osborne v Ohio: Does it Mean the End of the Protection Afforded by 
Stanley?" (1991) 69 Wash. U.L.Q. 
8. Donnelly, Christopher, T. "Protection of Ch ildren from Use in Pornography: Toward 
Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation" (1979) 12:2 Journal of Law Reform 
295. 
9. Hoffman, C. "men Worldviews Collide: Linguistic Theory Meets Legal Semantics 
in United States v X-Citement Video, Inc. [115 S. Ct. 464 (1994)]" (1995) 73 
Wash. U.L.Q. 1215. 
10. James, T.E. "The Age of Majority" (1960) 4 Am. J. Legal Hist. 22. 
70 
11. Kahn E. "When The Lion Feeds - And The Censor Pounces: A Disquisition on the 
Banning of Immoral Publications in South Africa" (1983) 100 SALJ 278. 
12. Kaplan, J.P. & Green, M.G. "Grammar and Inferences of Rationality in interpreting 
the Child Pornography Statute" (1995) 73 Wash. U.L.Q. 1223. 
13. Labuschagne, J.M.T. "Ouderdomsgrense en die Bestraffingvan Pedofilie" (1990) 16 
SACJ 10. 
14. Lazarus, M. "United States v Byrd [969 F. 2d 106 (1992)): scope of a 'crime of 
violence'for preventive detention purposes" (1993) 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1693. 
15. Manchester, C. "More about Computer Pornography" (1996) Crim. L. Rev. 645. 
16. Manchester, C. "Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: obscenity, pornography 
and videos" (1995) Crim. L. Rev. 123. 
17. Marcus, G. "The Wider Reaches of Censorship" (1985) 1 SAJHR 69. 
18. Quigley, J. "Child Pornography and the Right to Privao/" (1991) 43 U. Fla. L. 
Rev. 347. 
19. Schwartz, R. F. "Federal Child Pornography Law's Scienter Requirement - United 
States v X-Citement Video, Inc. [982 F.2d 1285 (1992)]" (1993) 28 Harv. c.R. 
- GL.L. Rev. 585. 
20. Schwartz, R.F. "Federal Child Pornography Law's Scienter Requirement - United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc." (1993) 28 Harv.C.R. - C.L Law Rev. 585. 
21. Silver, L. ""Who are the Custodians? A Closer Look at Publications Control" (1981) 
98 SALJ 105. 
22. Silver, L. "Sex, Nudity and the Average Man" (1980) 97 SALJ 125. 
23. Silver, L. "The Publications Appeal Board: A Closer Look at Nudity" (1982) 99 
SALJ 272. 
24. Sloth-Nielsen, J. "Chicken Soup or Chainsaws: some implications of the 
constitutionalisation of children's rights in South Africa" (1996) Acta Juridica 6. 
25. Smith, C. "SA's huge Sex Industry: Should the R500m business be legalized?" 
(1995) 66:7 Aug 17, Finance Week 25. 
26. Smith, L.S. "Private Possession of Child Pornography: Narrowing at-home Privao/ 
71 
Rights" (1993) Ann. Surv. Am. L. 1011. 
27. Stone, R. "Extending the Labyrinth: Part VII of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994" (1995) 58 Mod. L. Rev. 389. 
28. UNICEF position paper for the World Conference on Human Rights , Vienna, 
June 1993 "Sexual Exploitation: destrrying the lives of millions of children" (1995) 
May 18: 1 SALUS 14. 
29. Van Rooyen, K "Piifalls in Drafting a New Films and Publications Bill for South 
Africa" (1996) 29 De Jure 291. 
30. Van Rooyen, K "The End of the Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act" 
(1996) 9 SACJ 329. 
31. Van Rooyen, JCW "Censorship in a future South Africa: A legal perspective" (1993) 
26 De Jure 283. 
32. Whiting, R.c. "The Unwilling Possesor of Pornograplry" (1971) 88 SALJ 296. 
Text books 
1. Burchell and Milton Cases and Materials on criminal Law 2 ed. (1997). 
2. Burchell and Milton Principles OfCriniinal Law 2 ed (1997) . 
3. C R Snyman Criminal Law 3 ed. (1995). 
4. J.A. Robinson The Law of Children and Young Persons (1997). 
5. P.Q.R. Boberg The Law of Persons and the Fami"{y (1997). 
